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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on nancial market imperfections.
The rst essay analyzes the e¤ect of foreign entry on domestic banking markets.
This phenomenon is of interest to both regulators and academics. Previous empirical
studies have shown that the e¤ect of foreign entry is very di¤erent in developed versus
developing countries. For example, Claessens et al. (2001) nd that foreign banks
have lower prots than domestic banks in developed countries, but the opposite is
true in developing countries. An important concern in this context is the possibility
that foreign banks have di¢ culty in extending loans to small rms. This evidence,
which appears stronger in emerging markets, has led some policymakers to believe
that foreign banks "cherry pick", leaving the worst risks to the domestic banks. This
essay provides an integrated theoretical framework in which to examine these issues
and their implications for policy and institutions. Foreign entry and bank competi-
tion are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: the
entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbents informational
advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post
are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets.
The entrants success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o¤ering cheaper loans
increases with its e¢ ciency (cost) advantage. The model allows us to explore the
impact of entry and bank competition on rmsaccess to credit. In particular, this
model rationalizes the perceived bias that foreign banks lend more to large rms,
thereby neglecting small enterprises. At the same time, it also explains why better
informed domestic and local banks continue to nd a market among such small rms.
Lastly, it shows why this bias can be stronger in developing countries.
Banks deny loan applications of borrowers after learning that they are not cred-
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itworthy. These bad-risk borrowers can apply to loans from an entrant even if they
are denied credit by the incumbent. The second essay extends the model presented
in the rst chapter to include such bad-risk types. It shows how an incumbent banks
knowledge about the creditworthiness of its (previous) customers, in addition to that
of its existing clients, a¤ects the behavior of entrants into credit markets. An impor-
tant result here is that despite having a cost advantage over its rival, an entrants
ability to gain market share rst decreases, and then increases with increases in the
(average) quality of the borrower population. If the proportion of high risks is neither
su¢ ciently large that they can be pooled with bad-risk types, nor su¢ ciently small
so that they can be pooled with low-risk types, pooling contracts may no longer be
feasible. In particular, if it is also the case that the entrant cannot screen the high-risk
types, then the incumbent dominates despite the entrants cost advantage. Thus, for
low cost advantages, the entrant gains market share if the proportion of high risks is
either low or high, while the incumbent dominates for intermediate values.
The third essay (joint with Mara Faccio) is an empirical study analyzing corporate
responses to an economy-wide crisis. We concentrate on ve economies Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand that were hit by the Asian
nancial crisis of 1997-1998. Using data collected from a wide range of sources, this
study investigates the ways in which rms tried to avoid bankruptcy through restruc-
turing their assets and liabilities during the crisis. We analyze four types of response:
workouts, asset sales, mergers and liquidations. In addition, we consider rms that
do not undertake any visible form of restructuring. We nd the restructuring of li-
abilities to be the most common type of response. On the other hand, we argue
that rms may be reluctant to engage in major asset sales due to substantial price
discounts that need to be applied to these transactions during the crisis. In fact, we
document that transaction multiples dropped by 40% during the crisis, compared to
a pre-crisis period. We contrast nancial and corporate governance considerations
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and nd strong support for the notion that, during a crisis, nancial constraints have
a large impact on the restructuring choice. However, we nd that the explanatory
power of corporate governance (e.g., control) variables is at best, marginal.
3
CHAPTER II
FOREIGN ENTRY AND BANK COMPETITION
Introduction
Traditional theories of nancial intermediation assert that information asymme-
tries are central to bank lending. Prospective borrowers typically know more about
their ability to repay loans than lenders do. Accordingly, banks screen borrowers to
select high-quality entrepreneurs and reduce risk of default among low quality ones. A
more recent literature on relationship lending takes the view that repeated interactions
can reduce such information asymmetries between bank and borrower (see references
in Boot, 2004). According to this view, banks gain "knowledge" about payo¤-relevant
borrower attributes during the course of a lending relationship. Consequently, rela-
tionships emerge as a prime source of an incumbent banks comparative advantage
over potential outside lenders. This undermines competition in credit markets; the
incumbents superior information about its own clients weakens a competitors ability
to o¤er credit at lower interest rates.
The purpose of this essay is to understand how this problem a¤ects foreign en-
try and lending behavior in credit markets.1 Banks are modeled as asymmetrically
informed principals: the incumbent has complete information about borrower credit-
risk, but the entrant does not.2 This relies on the notion that much of the information
1The intention here (and in the title of the paper) is to use the term "foreign" in the broad sense
of the word. As Morgan and Strahan (2004, p. 241) observe, "In the United States, banks from
other states were long viewed as foreign, and most states strictly forbade entry by banks from other
states until the mid-1970s. Even banks from other cities within a state were often blocked from
opening branches in other cities in the state. Loosely speaking, the hometown bank was local, and
banks from anywhere else were foreign."
2At the outset, it is important to emphasize that borrower risk here refers to the unobservable
component in credit-risk, as opposed to observable risk, that is readily evaluated from company
nancial statements and credit reports. This paper considers de novo foreign entry in terms of
outside banks setting up a branch or a subsidiary in a new location. The analysis presented here
abstracts from alternative modes of entry like mergers and acquisitions, and from situations that
describe the complementarities between informed (bank) capital and uninformed capital (Morgan
et al. 2004; Morgan and Strahan, 2005).
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regarding a borrowers unobservable risk can only be obtained in the process of lend-
ing (Boot and Thakor 1994, 2000). This essay studies competition between an entrant
bank (uninformed lender) that faces observationally identical borrowers, who can be
one of two types (high-risk or low-risk), and an incumbent (informed lender) that can
distinguish between these borrower types.
In addition, banks may require the borrower to secure loans with collateral. Inter-
estingly, both theoretical and empirical ndings have shown that collateral require-
ments fall over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship (Boot and Thakor,
1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; Harho¤ and Körting, 1998).
This contrast between secured lending for new borrowers and unsecured lending for
established ones is suggestive of the information content in collateral requirements
(Sharpe, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 1994). Relevant to the discussion here is the im-
plication that this role of secured credit assumes greater importance for an entrant
seeking to create new relationships than for an incumbent lending to its established
clients. Accordingly, this paper uses a screening model, based on Besanko and Thakor
(1987a, hereafter B-T), to examine the entrants use of collateral as a screening device
to contest the incumbents informational advantage.
The results indicate that both ex ante better information and ex post stronger
legal protection can facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit
markets. Market segments characterized by a greater proportion of high-risk bor-
rowers frustrate the entrants ability to pool borrowers. On the other hand, poor
legal protection can prevent the use of collateral as an e¤ective means to success-
fully sort borrowers. In this model, both pooling and separating equilibria are shown
to exist. Importantly, the entrants success in gaining borrowers of higher quality
(lower risk) by o¤ering cheaper loans increases with its cost advantage. Three major
results are summarized here. First, for small cost advantages, the entrant cannot
attract both risk types either by pooling or by sorting. Consequently, it succeeds in
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capturing high-risk borrowers but not the low-risk ones. Second, both the entrants
success in pooling borrowers and its prots from such pooling contracts are increasing
in its cost advantage. Therefore, even with a moderate cost advantage, the entrant
can successfully pool all borrowers, but only in market segments characterized by a
higher fraction of low-risk borrowers. This result of the model helps in understanding
the di¤erences in observed lending behavior of entrants and incumbents in di¤erent
market segments. It indicates how incumbents are likely to retain clients in riskier
segments of the market when faced with more e¢ cient outside competitors that can
provide cheaper loans. Third, entry into sectors characterized by stronger informa-
tion asymmetries requires a su¢ ciently large cost advantage, so that the entrant can
successfully sort borrowers. The magnitude of this cost advantage is shown to depend
on the legal and institutional features of the host country. As discussed below, this
result formalizes a link between nancial development and the legal and informational
environment in which lenders and borrowers operate.
The theoretical results obtained here nd support in empirical ndings on entry
into credit markets both across states within the US (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998)
and across countries of the world (Claessens et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2004). The
model developed here also o¤ers a new insight for analyzing some of the evidence
that has received wide attention in recent empirical studies on (foreign) entry in
banking. Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e¤ect of foreign entry is very di¤erent
in developed versus developing countries. An important concern in this context is
the evidence suggestive of the possibility that foreign (and large national) banks have
di¢ culty extending loans to informationally opaque small rms (Stiglitz, 2000; Berger
et al. 2001, 2005). This evidence, which appears stronger in emerging markets, has
led some policymakers to believe that foreign banks cream skimor cherry pick,
leaving the worst risks to the domestic banks.3 This essay provides an integrated
3Racocha (2003) observes that, "In the Czech Republic, the privatization of banks had been
delayed ... by the experience with foreign banks that were entering the market since 1992 and
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theoretical framework to examine these issues and their implications for policy and
institutions (see Section 4 for details).
Theory predicts that collateral can help sort observationally identical borrowers:
entrepreneurs with lower risk of default post higher collateral that is unattractive to
high-risks (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987 a,b; DellAriccia and Marquez,
2005). Clearly, such predictions are based on unobservable risk, and the di¢ culty in
estimating such adverse selection models lies in nding direct measures of unobserv-
able risk characteristics.4 The representation of banks as asymmetrically informed
principals helps in getting around this problem. Here, a borrowers unobservable risk
is known only to the incumbent (from previous lending relationships), while a bor-
rowers observable risk is common knowledge. Therefore, by analyzing di¤erences in
the equilibrium behavior of asymmetrically informed banks, one can generate testable
predictions on collateral use that depend on unobservable risk characteristics.
The work most closely related to this paper is DellAriccia and Marquez (2004,
hereafter D-M), in which an entrant becomes a victim of the winners cursebecause
of the incumbents informational advantage. The entrant is unable to distinguish
between lemonsrejected by the incumbent and new borrowers shopping around for
lower interest rates (Broecker, 1990; DellAriccia et al. 1999). An interesting feature
of these models is that the incumbent successfully retains all of its creditworthy
clients, and therefore, the entrant e¤ectively competes for new borrowers only.5 Yet,
at any given time, the number of new entrepreneurs seeking credit may be small
when compared to the number of existing rms in the market. As a result, the
cherry-picking their clients."
4On the other hand, testing empirical predictions based on observable risk is relatively simpler.
Empirical evidence on pre-loan credit analysis reveals that commercial lenders require the observably
risky borrowers to pledge more collateral (Orgler 1970, Scott and Smith 1986, Berger and Udell 1990,
1992, 1995, Brick et al., 2005). This mitigates lendersproblems of moral hazard and strategic default
(Boot et al. 1991).
5DellArricia and Marquez (2005) study lending booms and nancial distress in situations where
banks use collateral to sort unknown borrowers. Here too, banks are unable to poach protably
from the pool of borrowers known to their rivals.
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entrants success on entry may depend on its ability to attract clients away from
the incumbent. Indeed, as Jayaratne and Strahan (1998, p. 240) note, a natural
process of selectionoccurs when better-managed, lower-cost banks expand at the
expense of ine¢ cient ones.Accordingly, this essay aims to study competition over the
incumbents captiveand creditworthy borrowers and the entrants ability to attract
creditworthy clients away from the incumbent. To this end, I consider a situation
where the incumbents informational advantage extends to all borrowers. Unlike D-
M (2004), banks are armed with the use of collateral requirements in their contracts.
The use of collateral is important in this context. First, Morgan and Strahan (2004)
observe that foreign banks respond more elastically to collateral shocks than domestic
banks.6 Second, Tornell and Westermann (2004) nd that collateral is viewed as a
signicant obstacle to obtaining bank credit in most middle income countries.
Why is removing entry barriers to competition important for credit market e¢ -
ciency? This paper follows Rajan and Zingales (2003, p.19) in their characterization
of a more e¢ cient nancial systemas one that facilitates entry, and thus leads to
lower prots for incumbent rms and nancial institutions.While there is almost no
opposition to the idea that an e¢ cient nancial system is one that helps new rms ob-
tain external nance, theory o¤ers competing hypotheses about whether competition
among nancial institutions (like banks) is benecial for economic activity (Gorton
and Winton, 2003). In contrast, a large body of empirical evidence argues that re-
laxing entry restrictions in banking helps both new and mature rms obtain external
nance (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996, 1998; Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and
Strahan, 2004).7 Indeed, any theory that seeks to explain the determinants of e¢ cient
6Morgan and Strahan (2004) use the value of a countrys traded equity as a proxy for the value
of potential collateral. Elsewhere, the use of collateral is pervasive in bank lending as reported in
empirical studies for US (Berger and Udell, 1990), UK (Black et al., 1996) and Germany (Harho¤and
Körting, 1998). The importance of collateral in theoretical studies on bank loans is best understood
when one considers the bankruptcy literature; there, bank debt is synonymous with secured debt, as
opposed to public debt, that tends to be unsecured (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; James, 1996).
7Indeed Cetorelli and Strahan (2004, p. 26) assert that recent empirical evidence on this debate
is unambiguous, "While theory does not paint a clear picture about how competition in banking
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nancial systems must account for entry barriers to new nancial institutions.
A growing literature suggests that a countrys institutions a¤ect nancial devel-
opment (Beck and Levine, 2005). Among the most prominent are empirical studies
by La Porta et al. (1997, 2000), which show that better legal protection against
expropriation by insiders increases the e¢ ciency of nancial systems (both corporate
nancing and development of nancial institutions). For corporate nancing, their
hypothesis follows from theories on corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In contrast, the precise channel through which a countrys legal institutions a¤ect the
development of its nancial institutions (like banks) is less well formalized.8 Why,
for instance, might stronger creditor rights lead to a more e¢ cient banking system?
In terms of the characterization of an e¢ cient nancial system as one that facilitates
entry, how might better legal protection assist in the entry of low-cost competitors?
This model formalizes a precise channel through which a countrys legal environment
a¤ects the e¢ ciency of its nancial markets by facilitating (or discouraging) the entry
of low-cost, outside competitors.
Before describing the details of this model, I sketch the intuition. Interestingly,
theoretical studies that demonstrate collateral use as a screening device also assume
that collateral is costly (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, b; Boot et al.,
1991). Banks incur a dissipative cost in taking possession of and liquidating collat-
eral. Consequently, the lender valuation of collateral is typically lower than that of
the borrower (Barro, 1976). Given that collateral is costly for a bank, better infor-
mation on borrower credit-risk (gained in the course of a bank-borrower relationship)
ought to a¤ect the rm-size distribution, the empirical work does. Comparing industry structure
across local markets within the U.S., or comparing structure across a large number of countries (both
developed and developing), one reaches the same conclusion. ... banks with market power erect an
important nancial barrier to entry to the detriment of the entrepreneurial sector of the economy,
perhaps in part to protect the protability of their existing borrowers."
8For example, Castro et al. (2004) study the impact of investor protection on economic growth,
while Levine (1998, 1999) traces the empirical linkages between legal environment, banking devel-
opment and economic growth. However, these papers point to no theoretical work that formalizes
the linkages between a countrys legal environment and the development of its nancial institutions.
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reduces a banks incentive to secure loans with collateral. This is consistent with
the ndings that collateral requirements fall over the duration of the bank-borrower
relationship. It also implies that in markets with poorer borrower quality overall, col-
lateral assumes greater importance for entrants than for incumbents. Stronger legal
protection reduces the deadweight losses of seizing and liquidating collateral and this
enables an entrant to bid more aggressively by screening the incumbents clients. In
contrast, weak legal protection discriminates against the uninformed entrant because
it reduces the e¢ cacy of collateral use. The model formalizes how variations in law
and its enforcement are central to the e¢ ciency and growth of nancial markets in
general (La Porta et al. 1997, 2000), and the banking sector in particular (Levine
1998, 1999).
The Model
I consider a risk-neutral economy in which each entrepreneur has unconstrained
access to collateral.9 The entrepreneur can borrow $1 from a bank and invest in a
project that yields revenue x with probability (1   ) and zero with probability .
Following B-T (1987a), a debt contract species a repayment R to the lender if the
project is successful, and an amount of collateral C( 0) to be paid to the lender if
the project fails; this contract is denoted as (R;C). As in Barro (1976), I assume a
disparity in collateral valuation between borrower and lender by dening the lenders
valuation of collateral as C, where 0   < 1. The project involves a xed non-
monetary cost U0 for the entrepreneur (the opportunity cost of her time). Lenders
are assumed to have a perfectly elastic supply of funds and I denote the banks cost
of these funds by . The entrepreneurs expected utility is U0 if she does not borrow,
9This assumption ensures that there are no distortions from endowment constraints. I assume
that the collateral pledged is tied to production so that liquidating collateral to self-nance the
project is never preferred to the bank loan (Boot et al., 1991).
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and U(R;C; ) = (1   )(x   R)   C if she borrows under the contract (R;C).
The banks payo¤ from contract (R;C) is given by (R;C; ) = (1  )R + C   
if it lends and 0 otherwise. The surplus generated from a loan contract (R;C) is
[(1   )x      U0]   (1   )C. Accordingly, when a bank uses a contract with a
positive collateral requirement C(> 0), there is a deadweight loss of social surplus
in the order of (1   )C. Banks face a xed pool of borrowers consisting of two
types: fraction  of borrowers are high-risk ( = h) and fraction 1    are low-risk
types ( = l), with 0 < l < h < 1. I assume (1  h)x > + U0 to ensure that all
(zero-collateral) loan contracts generate positive social surplus.
Using the setup described above, I model competition between an entrant bank
(Bank E) and an incumbent that (pre-entry) is a price setting monopolist (Bank I).
These banks di¤er on two counts. First, they have di¤erent costs of funds; Bank
Es cost of funds is E, while Bank Is cost of funds is I . I assume that these
di¤erences in the bankscost of funds arise because the two banks di¤er in their ef-
ciencies of converting deposits to loans (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 51). Second,
they are asymmetrically informed about borrower types; Bank I can distinguish be-
tween a high-risk and a low-risk borrower, while Bank E cannot.10 Stated di¤erently,
the information asymmetry in this model arises from the assumption that entrepre-
neurs have private information about , which can only be obtained by banks in the
course of a lending relationship. Like DellAriccia et al. (1999, p. 515.), I have
in mind a situation where the existing banks (i.e., incumbent) in a market have
10This stylized assumption follows Bond and Gresik (1997), and is intended to focus attention on
situations where the entrant competes over the incumbents existing clients.
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an informational advantage over other potential lenders (i.e., entrant) by virtue
of their established relationships with borrowers seeking credit. . . . In short, this
model studies bank competition as competition between asymmetrically informed
non-identical principals.11 The information asymmetry discussed here is only re-
stricted to distinguishing between borrower types. The payo¤ functions of banks
(their cost of funds, E and I) and the distribution of borrower types in the popu-
lation (the value of ) are common knowledge. If one denotes a banks prots from
loan (R;C) to borrower k by k(R;C)  (R;C; k), and Bank js o¤er to borrower
k by (Rjk; C
j
k) where j = I; E and k = h; l, then one can write Bank js overall prots
as j  jh(Rjh; Cjh) + (1  )jl (Rjl ; Cjl ). Also, borrower ks utility from loan (R;C)
can be written as Uk(R;C)  U(R;C; k), k = h; l.
I begin with a discussion of a single bank. A monopolist bank never requires
a borrower to secure a loan with collateral. Under both complete and incomplete
information, collateral is an ine¢ cient sorting device for a single bank, and is optimally
set to zero (B-T, 1987a). The key to a monopolist bank using collateral to sort
borrowers lies in relaxing the assumption that borrowers reservation utilities are
type-independent. Freixas and Rochet (1997) consider a situation of countervailing
incentives where borrowers exogenous reservation utilities are type-dependentthe
opportunity cost of the e¢ cient (low-risk) agent U0l is su¢ ciently higher than that of
11Several theoretical models have analyzed competition between symmetrically uninformed princi-
pals under perfect competition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), in duopolistic settings (Biglaiser and
Mezzetti 1993, 2000) and in common agency environments (Bernheim and Whinston 1985, 1986).
Although Bond and Gresik (1997) analyze situations of common agency, to the best of my knowledge,
theirs is the only other paper to study equilibrium behavior for principals that are asymmetrically
informed about agentspreferences.
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the ine¢ cient (high-risk) agent U0h , such that
U0l
1  l >
U0h
1  h . (1)
They argue that countervailing incentives, as given by (1), are needed to model an
uninformed monopolistic lender that uses collateral as a screening device. This model
endogenizes the situation of countervailing incentives by analyzing competition be-
tween asymmetrically informed principals. Theoretically, this helps in modeling the
entrants use of collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbents information
advantage.
Next, I consider contracts under complete information for both the entrant and the
incumbent. Note that collateral is an ine¢ cient sorting device and, under complete
information, is optimally set to zero. Therefore, (complete information) contracts
with zero collateral requirements are rst-best because they maximize social surplus.
I dene Rjk to be the rst-best maximum repayment that Bank j can charge borrower
k by providing her reservation utility U0, where k = h; l and j = I; E. Analogously,
R
¯
j
k is the rst-best minimum repayment that bank j can charge under complete in-
formation, subject to breaking even on borrower k. These rst-best repayments are
given by
Rjk = x 
U0
1  k ; (2)
and R
¯
j
k
 
j

=
j
1  k , where k = h; l and j = I; E. (3)
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While maximum repayment Rjk is the same for either bank (and henceforth, I drop
superscript j), the minimum R
¯
j
k depends on Bank js cost of funds 
j, j = I; E.
Also, a monopolist bank with complete information would charge Rk given by (2),
whereas the competitive equilibrium under complete information would have each
bank setting repayment at R
¯
j
k (
j), given in (3).
Banks as asymmetrically informed principals
Turning to the characterization of banks as asymmetrically informed principals,
one observes that Bank Is information advantage allows it to charge borrower k
any repayment in [R
¯
I
k(
I); Rk] and still break even (or better). However, Bank E
cannot charge any repayment in [R
¯
E
k (
E); Rk] because it cannot identify borrower
types. For example, Bank Es expected prots from its o¤er (R
¯
E
l (
E); 0) to low-risks
would always be negative because it cannot prevent high-risks from borrowing under
this contract. Therefore, o¤ering contract (R
¯
E
l (
E); 0) is a dominated strategy for
Bank E.
I start by eliminating contracts for each bank that are strictly dominated. In doing
so, I describe the sets of contracts that each bank can o¤er in competition. For the
incumbent bank, let ZIk(
I) denote the set of these contracts (RIk; C
I
k), one for each
borrower type, k = h; l. Similarly, the set ZE(E) consists of the entrants o¤ers. This
set includes both the set of pooling contracts (REP ; C
E
P ) (subscript P for "pooling"),
denoted by ZEP (
E), and the set of separating contracts [(REh ; C
E
h ); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )], denoted
by ZES (
E) (subscript S for "separating"). Finally, I characterize the equilibrium for
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all possible values of I and E.12 All proofs are given in Appendix.
Incumbent Bank First, since Bank I can identify borrower type, it will opti-
mally set the collateral requirement to zero in all its o¤ers. Second, it is a dominated
strategy for Bank I to o¤er a contract with Ik < 0. If 
I
k < 0 for some k, then Bank
I could protably withdraw this contract and shed the borrowers of type k. Lemma
1 characterizes Bank Is set of o¤ers in ZIk(
I).
Lemma 1 The incumbent bank o¤ers borrower k a contract from the set ZIk(
I) =
f(RIk; 0) : RIk 2 [R¯
I
k(
I); Rk]g where R¯
I
k(
I) and Rk are the incumbents rst-best min-
imum and rst-best maximum repayments respectively, k = h; l.
The stylized result of zero collateral requirements in the incumbents contract is
intended to capture a simple feature of credit markets: collateral requirements fall
as banks know more about a borrowers credit-risk. To summarize, I can restrict my
attention to Bank Is o¤er from the set ZIl (
I) for low-risk borrowers and the set
ZIh(
I) for high-risk types. From (2) and (3), I get Rk = x  U01 k and R¯
I
k(
I) = 
I
1 k ,
k = h; l. Contract (R
¯
I
k(
I); 0) yields borrower k the maximum utility Bank I can
provide, denoted U Ik (
I), and is dened by
U Ik (
I)  (1  k)x  I . (4)
Entrant Bank Bank E faces borrowers whose participation constraints are deter-
12An alternative approach could be to compute best response correspondences for each bank. This
approach is considerably more complicated and the model becomes less tractable; for example, Bank
Es best response to Bank Is o¤er of U Ih to h-types and U
I
l to l-types would need to be computed
for all possible values of I and E .
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mined by the utility from contracts o¤ered by Bank I. Therefore, in eliminating
dominated strategies for the entrant, I do not use participation constraints explic-
itly.13 Note that under competition, high-risk borrowers have the incentive to mimic
low-risk ones.14 A standard result follows: there is no distortion from rst-best in the
uninformed principals contract for the ine¢ cient agent (high-risk borrower). Bank
E never requires high-risks to secure their loans with collateral, i.e., CEh = 0. This
holds true for both pooling and separating contracts.15 Bank Es break-even pooling
contract is denoted by (RminP (
E); 0), where
RminP (
E) =
E
1  E (5)
andE = h+(1 )l is the expected value of . Note thatR¯
E
l (
E) < RminP (
E) <R
¯
E
h (
E),
where R
¯
E
k (
E) denotes Bank Es rst-best minimum repayments for borrower k. Bank
Es expected prots from (RminP (
E); 0) are zero; it subsidizes loans to high-risk bor-
rowers with prots from low-risk ones. The entrants pooling contracts are summa-
rized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The entrants o¤er of a pooling contract is from the set ZEP (
E) =
13When we show that the menu of contracts M is strictly dominated by a menu N (i.e., the
entrants prots from N are strictly greater than prots from M), we also show that menu N yields
both borrower types at least as much utility as menu M . In this process of eliminating dominated
strategies, it is implicit that if menu M satises the relevant participation constraints for both
borrower types, so does menu N .
14Under competition, principals o¤er agents more of the surplus so as to prevent competing prin-
cipals from luring them away. Since the surplus generated from borrower-l is greater than that from
borrower-h, high-risks have the incenitve to mimic low-risks to obtain the greater surplus.
15A separating contract [(REh ; C
E
h ); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] is strictly dominated by the menu [(R^
E
h ; 0);
(REl ; C
E
l )], where Uh(R^
E
h ; 0) = Uh(R
E
h ; C
E
h ). Similarly, a pooling contract (R
E
P ; C
E
P ) is strictly dom-
inated by the menu [(R^Eh ; 0); (R
E
P ; C
E
P )], where Uh(R^
E
h ; 0) = Uh(R
E
P ; C
E
P ). Note that our assertion
in footnote 13 holds true.
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f REP ; 0 : REP 2 [RminP (E); Rh]g where RminP (E) is the minimum the entrant can
charge in a pooling contract subject to breaking even.
The next result characterizes Bank Es separating contracts by the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3 The entrants o¤er of separating contracts [(REh ; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] in the
set ZES (
E) must satisfy:
(a) high-risk borrowers incentive constraint (IC h) binds, Uh(REh ; 0) = Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l );
(b) overall expected prots are non-negative, E[
 
REh ; 0

; (REl ; C
E
l )]  0;
(c) expected prots from loans to low-risk types are non-negative, El (R
E
l ; C
E
l )  0.
Result (a) follows from the single-crossing property.16 Result (b) follows from
Bank Es choice to lend. Finally, if El < 0 in any menu [(R
E
h ; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] that
satises (a) and (b), then Bank E can always protably withdraw the contract for
l-types. If l-types now select the remaining contract for h-types, Bank Es expected
prots from both types will be positive. This gives (c). In summary, I will dene the
set of contracts that Bank E can o¤er by ZE(E) = ZEP () [ ZES () where ZEP () and
ZES () are given by Lemmas 2 and 3.
Bank competition
The timing of events is as follows. Nature selects borrower types and while Bank I
16If IC h is slack, Bank E can provide the l-type borrowers a new contract with a higher R and
a lower C and increase its prots. If the new contract yields the l-types the same utility as the
old contract, it must yield the h-types strictly greater utility. This follows from the single-crossing
property: h-types preference for a contract with a higher R and a lower C is greater compared to
the l-type. Since we start from a position where IC h is slack, we can nd such a new contract that
still satises this constraint for the high-risk borrower. Also, Bank E will prefer the new contract
(with a higher R and a lower C) since it yields higher prots. Therefore in an o¤er by Bank E, IC h
must bind.
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observes this, Bank E does not. Banks move rst, simultaneously, anticipating agents
subsequent behavior, and optimizing accordingly within the set of contracts. Bank
I sets out two contracts, one for each type, from ZIk(
I), k = h; l. Bank E o¤ers
any contract in ZE(E). Each entrepreneur chooses the contract that maximizes
her ex ante expected utility. For example, the low-risk entrepreneur selects from
Bank Is o¤er in ZIl (
I) and Bank Es o¤er in ZE(E); if Bank E o¤ers a menu
[
 
REh ; 0

; (REl ; C
E
l )], borrower l can choose either contract in this menu or Bank Is
o¤er of (RIl ; C
I
l ) to low-risk types. Finally, contracts are executed.
I focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria. An equilibrium of this game is
a menu of contracts such that each banks choice of menu maximizes its expected
prots given the contracts o¤ered by the other bank and the maximizing choices of
the borrowers. As is standard in the principal-agent literature, I will assume that
if the borrower is indi¤erent between two loan contracts o¤ered by the same bank,
she chooses the one that the bank prefers. Also, if a borrower is indi¤erent between
contracts o¤ered by the incumbent and the entrant, in equilibrium she borrows from
the bank that makes higher prots from the contract.17
To derive a complete characterization of equilibria, I hold the entrants cost of
funds constant at E and vary the incumbents cost of funds I . In what follows, I
will describe the equilibria for situations where entrant has the cost advantage, that
is, I > E; rst, for the entrants o¤er of a separating contract (Proposition 1) and
then for its o¤er of a pooling contract (Proposition 2). Details of the equilibria for
17When a borrower is indi¤erent between loan contracts o¤ered by two banks, where one bank
makes positive prots and other bank zero, then the bank that makes positive prots can lower its
prots by  > 0 and o¤er the borrower greater utility. The bank making zero prots cannot do so
and still break even.
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I  E, along with all the proofs, are provided in the Appendix A. Finally, this
section concludes with a summary of the characterization of equilibria (see Table 1
and Figure 2).
I begin by describing the solution to a particular case of this problem, namely
the situation in which the entrant bank can successfully screen borrowers. As will be
described shortly, the entrant bank cannot always successfully screen borrowers; it
can only do so when its cost advantage is su¢ ciently large, that is, when I is greater
than the screening cuto¤ ~h;lS  
E
1 (1 )l . This case is discussed in the next paragraph
and the optimal contract for the entrant when I  ~h;lS is derived in Appendix B.
The optimal contract derived in Appendix B helps in building the intuition behind
the screening cuto¤ ~h;lS described in Proposition 1(a).
Bank E can successfully sort all borrowers only if its incentive scheme yields at
least as much utility as contracts o¤ered by Bank I. Consequently, Bank E faces bor-
rowers whose reservation utilities are determined by the maximum utility that Bank
I can o¤er borrowers, that is, U Ik (
I). From (12), it follows that
UIl
1 l >
UIh
1 h . This
inequality holds for all I , given the earlier assumption I < (1 h)x U0. Stated dif-
ferently, Bank Es optimization problem can be viewed as that of a monopolist facing
borrowers with type-dependent reservation utilities U Ik (
I) that satisfy countervailing
incentives.18 Appendix B provides the solution to this optimization problem. Note
that the solution is built on the premise that the entrant is able to dominate the
incumbent.19 Evidently, this does not hold true for all values of I > E. The
18As mentioned earlier, Freixas and Rochet (1997) require countervailing incentives, the exogenous
condition (1), to show an uninformed lenders use of collateral as a screening equilibrium. Note that,
here, this condition is derived endogenously.
19Domination by a principal implies that it can attract all agent types away from its rival (Biglaiser
19
equilibria in such cases are discussed in Proposition 1(b) given below.
Proposition 1 (a) If I  ~h;lS > E and  > 1, where ~h;lS  
E
1 (1 )l and
1  (1 )l(1 l)(h l) (1 )2l , then the incumbent o¤ers (R¯
I
h; 0) to high-risks and (R¯
I
l ; 0) to
low-risks. The entrant o¤ers [(R
¯
I
h; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] where Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = Uh(R¯
I
h; 0) and
Ul(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0). If 
I > ~h;lS , the entrant captures all borrowers and its
expected prots from all loans are strictly positive. If I = ~h;lS , low-risks borrow
from either bank but high-risks borrow only from the entrant. Expected prots from
loans to low-risks are zero but the entrants prots from loans to high-risks are strictly
positive.
(b) If ~h;lS > 
I > E, the entrant o¤ers [(R
¯
I
h; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] where Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) =
Uh(R¯
I
h; 0) and 
E
l (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = 0. The incumbent o¤ers (R¯
I
h; 0) to high-risks and 
RIl ; 0

to low-risks where Ul
 
RIl ; 0

= Ul(R
E
l ; C
E
l ). High-risks go to the entrant
but the incumbent retains the low-risks. Banksexpected prots from loans disbursed
are strictly positive.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1(a) provides a cut-o¤ ~h;lS  
E
1 (1 )l such that,
when I > ~h;lS , the entrant can capture all borrowers by o¤ering a separating contract.
How does the entrants cost advantage help in competing with its informed rival?
Clearly, a bank with lower cost generates a greater surplus from loans to borrowers
than its rival. Thus, it is able to provide a borrower the maximum surplus that
its rival can generate (from loans to the same borrower) and still retain a part of
the surplus for itself. Providing this surplus is easy when the lender can distinguish
borrower type but more di¢ cult when the lender has to sort borrowers. As noted
and Mezzetti, 1993).
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earlier, sorting borrowers with a positive collateral requirement C(> 0) is costly
because it implies a deadweight loss of (1 )C. In Appendix B it is shown that, in
a separating equilibrium where the entrant captures the low-risks, it requires the low-
risks to secure loans with collateral CEl = 
I . But, in the event of failure (which occurs
with probability l), the entrant gets only I after liquidation: an expected loss of
(1  )lI . Since the entrant factors in such ex post deadweight losses in calculating
prots ex ante, a simple cost advantage E < I is insu¢ cient to capture low-risks.
A greater cost advantage is needed to overcome this informational disadvantage; the
condition under which the entrant dominates the incumbent is given by E < I  
(1  )lI (Proposition 1a).
When the entrant dominates the incumbent by using a separating contract, it
gives borrowers two options: the rst merely matches the incumbents o¤er to high-
risks, but the second o¤ers a cheaper loan rate than the incumbents o¤er to low-risks.
However, among borrowers with indistinguishable risk, the entrant o¤ers the second to
only those who pledge collateral. Note that, since CEl = 
I , this collateral requirement
increases with the entrants cost advantage (recall that the model assumes that all
entrepreneurs have unconstrained access to collateral). In the next section, these
results are used to explain why foreign banks tend to lend less to smaller rms.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1(b) holds for all values of . Strictly
speaking, Proposition 1(b) characterizes a candidate equilibrium; if there is no pooling
contract that does better for the entrant, then this candidate will be the equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates the (candidate) equilibrium in Proposition 1(b) in (R;C) space.
Borrowerspayo¤s increase as one moves southwest, while lendersprots increase
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Figure 1: Equilibrium when banks split the market in (R, C) space: Equilibrium for the case
~ > I > E . Bank I o¤ers A0 to the H-types and C 0 to the L-types. Bank E o¤ers the menu
(A0; B0). Here Bank Es prots from the contract B0 are zero, but Bank I makes positive prots
from contract C 0. Bank Is prots from the contract A0 is zero, but Bank E makes positive prots
from the same contract. Banks split the market; the high-risk types borrow from the entrant and
the low-risk types borrow from the incumbent.
going northeast. Indi¤erence curves for borrowers (indicated by Uh and Ul) are given
by the pairs of thin lines: high-risks have steeper indi¤erence curves than low-risks
(single-crossing property). Line 1 (in bold) passing through (R
¯
E
l ; 0) is the entrants
zero-prot line for l-types. Note that it is atter than the indi¤erence curves for
l-types. The broken line 2 passing through (RminP ; 0) is the locus of (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) such
that Uh
 
REh ; 0

= Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) (Lemma 3a) and 
E[
 
REh ; 0

; (REl ; C
E
l )] = 0. This line
passes through ( REl ; C
E
l ) and the entrant o¤ering menu [(R¯
E
h ; 0); ( R
E
l ;
CEl )]makes zero
prots from both h-types and l-types. Clearly, the entrants o¤ers in ZE(E) lie in the
shaded region, bounded from below by lines 1 and 2. Bank I o¤ers A0 to the h-types
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and C0 to the l-types. Bank E o¤ers the menu (A0; B0). Here, Bank Es prots from
contractB0 are zero, but Bank I makes positive prots from contractC0. On the other
hand, Bank Is prots from contract A0 are zero, but Bank E makes positive prots
from the same contract. Accordingly, banks split the market; the high-risks borrow
from the entrant and the low-risks borrow from the incumbent. Note that Bank E
attracts both borrower types if it o¤ers the menu [(R
¯
E
h ; 0); (
REl ;
CEl )]. However, it
chooses menu (A0; B0) that yields higher prots overall. By holding E constant, the
entrants o¤ers in ZE(E) are xed to the shaded region in Figure 1. Varying the
incumbents cost of funds I changes minimum repayment R
¯
I
k(
I) in (3). It follows
that di¤erent I give rise to di¤erent equilibria in the model. These include equilibria
where the entrant pools borrowers as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If   1 and I > ~2P () where ~2P ()  
E
1 ( 
1  )(
h l
1 l
)
, the
entrant pools at (R
¯
I
l (
I); 0). The incumbents best response is to o¤er (R
¯
I
h(
I); 0) to
high-risks and (R
¯
I
l (
I); 0) to the low-risks. The entrant captures all borrowers and its
expected prots overall are non-negative.
Figure 2 characterizes two non-linear bounds for the entrants pooling contracts,
~1P () and ~
2
P () that are both strictly increasing and strictly convex in . The
rst bound ~1P ()  ( 1 l1 E )E, characterizes a feasibility condition for the entrants
pooling contracts; the entrant can successfully pool borrowers only if I > ~1P ().
First, note that for I  ~1P (), the entrant fails to pool borrowers because the
incumbent undercuts the entrants o¤er to capture low-risk types. Second, this bound
is increasing in , indicating that a higher cost advantage is required to pool borrowers
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Figure 2: A complete characterization of the equilibria: The entrants cost is xed at E and the
gure describes equilibria for varying levels of the incumbents cost I . The shaded region II shows
the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 (b). The incumbent dominates in region I, while the
entrant dominates by sorting borrowers in region III and by pooling them in region IV.
in markets characterized by stronger information asymmetries. Finally, for all such
pooling contracts, the entrants prots from loans to low-risks are always greater than
that from loans to high-risks. In fact, if entrants cost advantage is not too large, it
subsidizes losses from high-risks with prots from low-risk borrowers. Consequently,
the entrants choice of a pooling contract is optimal only if the proportion of high-risks
in the borrower population is su¢ ciently small (  1).
This gives a second bound, ~2P () (for   1), which characterizes an opti-
mality condition for the entrants pooling contracts; if I > ~2P () and   1, the
entrants optimal strategy is to pool all borrowers. This second bound determines
the entrants choice between its pooling option (Proposition 2) and its o¤er of a
contract that captures high-risk borrowers only (Proposition 1b). Notice that when
~2P ()  I > ~1P () and   1, the entrant can pool all borrowers cross subsidizing
high-risks with 0prots from low-risk types. Instead, it o¤ers a separating contract
24
as given in Proposition 1(b). Although this contract captures high-risk borrowers
but not low-risk ones, it yields higher prots than the entrants pooling option. The
converse is true for I > ~2P () and   1. This second bound is increasing in ,
showing that a higher cost advantage is required to o¤set the subsidies to a larger
proportion of high-risks in the population. Note that when  = 1, ~2P () = ~
h;l
S .
In summary, the entrant uses a pooling contract if and only if (i) the entrant
has a su¢ ciently large cost advantage and (ii) the proportion of high-risk borrowers
in the population is small, as given by region IV in Figure 2. Since the entrants
o¤er of a pooling contract has a zero collateral requirement, competition between the
entrant and the incumbent here is much like Bertrand competition as modeled in DM
(2004).20
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes and shows how the cost advantage of
the entrant helps to overcome the information advantage of the incumbent. When the
incumbent has both the cost and information advantage, it emerges as a contestable
monopolist: it can match any o¤er by the entrant and still make positive prots. Re-
call that the entrant always o¤ers a zero-collateral contract to high-risks. Therefore,
the bank with the lower cost of funds captures high-risk borrowers. Moreover, if nei-
ther bank has the cost advantage, both entrant and incumbent can get the high-risks,
but in competing with each other, prots from loans to high-risks are run down to
zero. To illustrate why the entrant cannot capture low-risks when I = E, recall that
it is a dominated strategy for Bank E to o¤er contract (R
¯
E
l (
E); 0). When I = E,
20The equilibrium discussed here is similar to the situation in DM (2004) where the entrant emerges
as a contestable monopolist. Just like in our model, Bank 2 (entrant) is a contestable monopolist if
(i) proportion of unknown borrowers () (their proxy for the degree of information asymmetry) is
high and (ii) the entrants cost of funds () is low. See DM (2004), Figure 1, p.192.
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it follows that R
¯
I
l =R¯
E
l ; and although the incumbent can always o¤er (R¯
I
l (
I); 0)
to low-risks, the entrant cannot match this o¤er with contract (R
¯
E
l (
E); 0). This
characterization of equilibria for I  E is given by region I in Figure 2.
The importance of the (candidate) separating equilibrium can be understood for
situations where I < ~h;lS (see Figure 2). First, consider situations where it is optimal
for the entrant to pool borrowers (i.e.,   1), but o¤ering a pooling contract is
infeasible because I  ~1P (). Nevertheless, the entrant can capture high-risks in such
situations using contracts in ZES (
E). For example, if   1 and ~1P ()  I > E, the
candidate equilibrium in Proposition 1(b) emerges as the equilibrium of the game.
Second, as noted earlier, with ~2P ()  I > ~1P () the entrant o¤ers a separating
contract as given in Proposition 1(b), despite the fact that it can o¤er a pooling
contract and capture all borrowers. Third, the same logic applies in situations where
~h;lS > 
I > ~1P () and  > 1.
The three situations described above belong to the set of equilibria given by Propo-
sition 1(b), in which the entrant cannot capture the high-quality (low-risk) borrowers
despite its cost advantage. This set is characterized by the shaded region II in Figure
2. Only when the entrants cost advantage is su¢ ciently large does it dominate the
incumbent and capture all borrowers. Figure 2 provides a characterization of these
equilibria. Region III characterizes the entrants o¤er of a separating contract as
given in Proposition 1(a). Equilibria for the entrants pooling contract in Proposition
2 are shown as region IV.
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Table 1. Characterization of Equilibria
Bankscost of funds Contract used Borrower h Borrower l Bank Is prots Bank Es prots
by entrant goes to goes to high-risk low-risk high-risk low-risk
I< E separating Bank I Bank I + + (x) (x)
I= E separating either bank Bank I 0 + 0 (x)
h;lS > 
I> E() separating Bank E Bank I (x) + + (x)
~h;lS = 
I , > 1 separating Bank E either bank (x) 0 + 0
I > ~h;lS ,  > 1 separating Bank E Bank E (x) (x) + +
I > ~2P () ,   1 pooling Bank E Bank E (x) (x) +=  +
() These candidate equilibria become equilibria of the model for either  > 1 or when both   1
and I  ~2P . Positive, negative and zero prots of a bank are denoted by the signs +,   and 0
respectively. The sign (x) implies that the bank does not get the borrower.
Implications of the model
I show next that the lessons gleaned from this highly stylized model can be of
general interest. To this end, I discuss some of the important theoretical results (and
their associated empirical predictions) in terms of the existing empirical evidence on
foreign entry into credit markets.
Domestic welfare
A simple prediction of this model is that the removal of entry barriers lowers the
rates at which credit is available to borrowers. Note that even when the incumbent has
both cost and information advantage, relaxing entry restrictions means that it can no
longer extract the entire surplus generated from loans. The threat of entry forces the
incumbent (contestable monopolist) to provide borrowers the surplus that a potential
competitor could provide in such situations. Thus, the removal of entry barriers in
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credit markets signicantly raises borrower payo¤s. This initial result agrees with
empirical studies like Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) that nd declines in average
loan prices of about 40 basis points following branching deregulation in the US.
Interestingly, a rise in prots for the foreign entrant is matched by a corresponding
decline in prots for its domestic rival (incumbent). Does foreign entry in banking hurt
the domestic economy? Two key features of the model can help answer this question.
First, poaching the incumbents clients is possible only if the entrant provides them
the surplus that the incumbent can generate from loans. From a domestic country
perspective, the entry of foreign banks redistributes the surplus from domestic banks
to borrowers. Second, the entrant can successfully attract borrowers only when it has
the cost advantage. By virtue of its lower cost of funds, the entrant bank generates a
greater surplus from a loan contract than the incumbent. These expected e¢ ciency
gains can be passed on to the borrowers. For instance, when the entrant o¤ers a
pooling contract, high-risks obtain a strictly greater yield than that provided by the
domestic bank. To summarize, under no equilibrium are domestic agents (banks and
borrowers) worse o¤ in aggregate.
Small business lending, cream skimming and foreign banks
Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e¤ect of foreign entry is very di¤erent in
developed versus developing countries. First, they nd that foreign banks have lower
prots than domestic banks in developed countries, but the opposite is true in devel-
oping countries. Second, their estimation results suggest that an increased presence
of foreign banks leads to a lower protability for domestic banks. Not surprisingly,
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a concern among policymakers and economists, particularly in emerging markets, is
that foreign banks cream skimor cherry pick, leaving the worst risks to the do-
mestic banks. A related issue is that foreign banks (and large domestic banks) tend
to lend more to large rms, thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
(Stiglitz, 2000; Berger et al. 2001, 2005; Clarke et al. 2001). Evidence in favor of this
bias exists for the US (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al. 2005) and for developing
countries like Argentina (Berger et al. 2001). Clarke et al. (2001) nd that foreign
bank entry improves nancing conditions for enterprises of all sizes, although larger
rms benet more. However, their study does not distinguish whether foreign banks
provide credit to both large rms and SMEs, or foreign bank competition for large
customers leads domestic banks to increase SME credit.21
The evidence discussed above can be rationalized in terms of the model. Notice
that the model characterizes di¤erent equilibria for di¤erent degrees of the entrants
cost (e¢ ciency) advantage. A likely scenario for developed countries is that the foreign
entrants cost advantage is signicantly small. The model predicts that for very low
degrees of cost advantage, like E < I < ~1P (), an entrant can attract only high-risk
borrowers from among the incumbents clients. Since the incumbent almost always
retains borrowers of higher quality, this could explain why foreign banks record lower
prots than their domestic counterparts in developed economies.
In contrast, the entrants cost advantage in developing countries is likely to be
higher. Depending on how large this e¢ ciency advantage is, the theory points to two
21This issue is further complicated by di¤erent macroeconomic conditions across countries and by
the role of domestic banks in these countries. For instance, in the context of emerging markets like
India, there is evidence of even public sector banks rationing credit to a section of domestic rms
(Banerjee and Duo, 2001).
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possible scenarios. When this advantage is su¢ ciently large (I > ~h;lS ), the entrant
can use pooling and separating contracts to dominate the incumbent. However, for
moderately high cost advantages, like ~h;lS > 
I > ~1P (), only a pooling contract
allows the entrant to capture all borrowers. In summary, the model predicts that
for larger cost advantages, the foreign bank can dominate its domestic counterpart,
particularly in sectors where the domestic banksclients are of superior quality (low-
risk). This accounts both for foreign banks recording higher prots than domestic
banks in emerging markets and for an increased presence of foreign banks reducing
the protability of domestic banks, consistent with the ndings in Claessens et al.
(2001).
For moderately high cost advantages, the entrants ability to attract low-risk bor-
rowers depends on the value of . This could explain, for example, the di¤erences
in the observed lending behavior of foreign banks in di¤erent market segments. To
see this, consider the (domestic) borrower market as composed of di¤erent market
segments, each with its own value of . For example, a lower  (smaller proportion
of high-risks) characterizes a market segment where the average borrower quality is
higher. By pooling both risk types, the entrant captures all of the incumbents clients
in these market segments. On the other hand, the entrant (despite its cost advantage)
fails to screen borrowers in markets segments characterized by a high  (region II in
Figure 2). In these segments, the entrant can attract only high-risks.
This stylized result has two important implications. First, it helps provide an
interpretation of the policymakersconcern about foreign banks "cream-skimming"
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domestic borrowers.22 If "cream-skimming" is interpreted as dominance over better-
quality market segments, then the entrant banks ability to capture all borrowers in
high quality (low ) market segments can be viewed as cream-skimming. On the
other hand, if cream skimming is interpreted as the entrants ability to capture only
the low-risk types, then the results show that it is not possible for the entrant to
cream-skim domestic borrowers.23 Second, the result can also explain the perceived
lending bias of foreign banks against SMEs. As is well known, small business lending
is based on "soft information" and is characterized by a larger proportion of borrowers
that are high-risk (in terms of this model, a high ). On the other hand, the large-
rm market segment can be characterized by a larger proportion of borrowers that
low risk (i.e., characterized by low ). With a moderately high cost advantage, the
entrant captures all borrowers in this market. However, in markets characterized by
a high  (as is true for SMEs), the incumbent, despite its cost disadvantage, retains
the low-risk types. Whereas the entrant gains all borrowers in the large-rm market
segment, it succeeds in attracting only a fraction of the borrower population in the
small-rm segment, accounting for the observed bias in lending.
22Given our assumption that the foreign entrant faces an information disadvantage, it seems
paradoxical to think of a foreign bank cream-skimming borrowers. Although, a foreign bank may
choose to cream-skim borrowers based on observable risk.
23Admittedly, I have assumed that the entrant has the informational disadvantage. However, note
that the principal-agent literature discusses cream-skimming by an uninformed principal (entrant)
as an equilibrium where the ine¢ cient agent (high-risk borrower) can be priced out of the market
(Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 604). This involves the entrant o¤ering a shutdown contract that
is accepted only by the e¢ cient agent (low-risk borrower), but rejected by his ine¢ cient counterpart
(La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, p. 38). However, this model shows that under competitive pressures
from the incumbent, the entrant cannot o¤er a shutdown contract in equilibrium. Moreover, in a
separating equilibrium where the entrant dominates, the entrants ex ante expected prots from
high-risk borrowers are always greater than that from low-risk borrowers. Thus, the entrant would
not choose to cream-skim low-risk borrowers.
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Legal protection
In markets with a larger fraction of high-risk borrowers (higher ), a low cost
entrant can successfully sort borrowers only if its cost advantage is su¢ ciently large
(region III in Figure 2). Securing loans with collateral entails a deadweight loss of
(1 )lI . This loss is high in environments where  is low; that is, when dissipative
costs of seizing and liquidating collateral are high.24 The parameter  is the fraction
of the pledged collateral that the lender can recover in the event of a default on the
loan. Stated di¤erently,  can be viewed as a proxy for legal e¢ ciency, with higher s
corresponding to better legal enforcement.25 Either way, stronger creditor protection
and/or better law enforcement reduces the losses from default and thus encourages
entrants to bid more aggressively for borrowers. This leads to a testable prediction
of the model:
Prediction : Ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that reduce the cost
of liquidating collateral should witness greater foreign bank lending.
The entrants success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o¤ering cheaper
loans is su¢ ciently enhanced by increasing the e¢ ciency of collateral use. In a recent
study on how legal changes a¤ect lending behavior, Haselmann et al. (2005) nd that
lending volume increases subsequent to legal changes facilitating the use of collateral,
24This could range from direct costs, like legal fees and accounting services, to indirect costs like
time and e¤ort in acquiring and selling the secured asset. Also, deadweight losses may arise from
information and holdout problems that characterize nancial distress (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991;
James, 1996).
25A caveat in this interpretation is that some of the debate on the distribution of rights between
creditor and debtor is misguided. Stiglitz (2001, p. 4) observes "what is critical is the clarity of
those rights; presumably, the terms of the contract can be adjusted to reect those rights....Di¤erent
bankruptcy rules do impose di¤erent information burdens and imply di¤erent allocations of risk
bearing, and some of these arrangements may actually be ine¢ cient."
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and that foreign greeneld banks extend their lending volume substantially more than
domestic banks. Markets where creditor rights provide stronger protection to lenders
will witness lower deadweight losses both in the repossession and in the liquidation
of collateral; this, in turn, will promote entry of low-cost competitors. The argument
above summarizes how an e¢ cient legal framework helps in building an e¢ cient -
nancial market by promoting entry of low-cost competitors. It provides a theoretical
underpinning for empirical ndings on the legal determinants of the development of
nancial intermediaries like banks (Levine 1998, 1999).
It is worthwhile to recall that stronger legal protection (higher , and consequently,
a lower ~h;lS ) makes it easier for entrants to sort borrowers. Conversely, poor legal
practices that increase deadweight losses (a higher ~h;lS ) can exacerbate the di¢ culties
that foreign entrants face in lending to informationally opaque small rms. This result
in the model explains why the foreign banksbias against SMEs appears stronger
in emerging markets, where deadweight losses, both in the repossession and in the
liquidation of collateral, can be quite large. As stated above, this has important
policy implications for host countries: better creditor protection can facilitate foreign
bank lending to small businesses.
Borrowers with collateral constraints
The previous result begs the following question: does the entrants large rm bias
disappear if it can successfully screen high-risk borrowers? This model can be ex-
tended to show that the uninformed lenders bias towards larger rms can persist
even if lending towards SMEs as a whole increase. Here, the separating equilibria
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in this framework identify a di¤erent mechanism at work. The earlier assumption
that borrowers have unconstrained access to collateral is relaxed. In particular, it is
assumed that there exists a distribution of borrowers (rms) who di¤er in their ability
to post collateral. More specically, I now assume that within a group of borrowers
with indistinguishable risk, larger rms can readily post more collateral (per dollar of
borrowings) whereas smaller rms can only pledge a lower C. This new assumption
alters little in terms of equilibrium behavior of banks. In particular, one can focus
attention on the equilibrium described in Proposition 1(a). Note that, if the entrant
reduces the collateral requirement for low-risks, incentive compatibility requires that
it reduce loan rates for the high-risks as well. Also, it can be shown that the en-
trants prots from the high-risks (Eh ) are greater than that from low-risks (
E
l ) (See
Appendix):
Eh = 
I   E
and El = [1  (1  )l]I   E: (6)
Given that the prots from high-risks are strictly greater than that from low-risks, the
entrant will not alter its collateral requirement for low-risks as long as the proportion
of high-risks in the population is large ( > ^). Simply put, the entrant o¤ers the
following two options: (i) loans at a rate similar to the domestic banks o¤er to high-
risks and (ii) loans at a rate cheaper than the domestic banks o¤er to low-risks, but
only to those who pledge collateral CEl = 
I . In terms of the model, this implies that
among borrowers with indistinguishable risk, the cheaper loan is available only to
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those willing to pledge collateral. This result gives another prediction of this model:
Prediction : Conditional on observable risk, entrants to a credit market provide
cheaper loans only to those borrowers who are willing to pledge (more) collateral.
From a borrowers perspective, it appears that o¤ers by the entrant are biased
towards larger rms that can readily post collateral. Low-risk borrowers that cannot
post this collateral will go to the (informed) local bank. This result accounts for
the perceived bias in the entrants separating contracts: larger rms that can post
collateral go to the entrant, while the incumbent attracts only low-risk borrowers that
are constrained in their ability to post collateral.
An important consideration here is that small rms tend to be observationally
riskier than large rms. However, within the same categories of observable risk, it is
likely that larger rms can readily full the collateral requirement that smaller rms
cannot. There is some evidence in support of this phenomenon: Haynes et al. (2001)
show that the smallest among small business borrowers in the US have less access to
credit from large banks than other small business borrowers.
Again, one can explain why this problem turns out to be greater in emerging
markets. First, note that the information problems are likely to be more acute (greater
) in developing countries. Second, the entrants cost advantage is also likely to be
greater (higher I). In terms of the model, a greater cost advantage implies a higher
collateral requirement (CEl = 
I). Finally, the collateralizable wealth of borrowers
tends to be lower in developing countries. These three factors can combine to make
this bias against SMEs seem more acute in developing countries.
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Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. To the best of my knowl-
edge, it is the rst paper that analyzes bank competition as competition between
asymmetrically informed principals where contract menus (loan rates and collateral)
are the strategic variables of competition. This theoretical approach has some impor-
tant advantages.
First, it helps tie the early literature on information theories of credit to more re-
cent studies in law and nance under a single framework. In a recent paper, Djankov
et al. (2004) classify the literature on private credit into two broad, but interlinked
categories: information theories of credit and theories that stress the importance
of creditorsrights. This chapter demonstrates how these two categories are inter-
linked; it supports their assertions that better legal environment can help overcome
the stronger informational disadvantages that potential entrants encounter in credit
markets. Conversely, limited property rights and poorly functioning legal systems
can combine to reduce the use of collateralizable assets, thereby diminishing poten-
tial entrants ability to sort borrowers. This conclusion from the model provides
a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical studies on the importance of legal
environments in explaining the variation in the size of private credit markets.
Second, as shown in the previous section, the results in this chapter nd support
in empirical work related to foreign entry in banking. Furthermore, the model makes
two testable predictions. First, ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that
reduce the cost for seizing and liquidating collateral should witness greater foreign
bank lending, particularly to SMEs. Second, the model predicts that in lending to
36
observably riskier borrowers (like small rms) entrants to a credit market are likely
to provide cheaper loans only to borrowers pledging more collateral. As mentioned
earlier, these predictions on collateral use depend on borrowersunobservable risk
characteristics as opposed to previous studies that discuss observable risk.
Third, the model allows us to explore the impact of entry and bank competition
on rmsaccess to credit. In particular, this model can explain the perceived bias
that foreign (and large domestic) banks lend more to large rms thereby neglecting
small enterprises. At the same time, it also explains why better informed domestic
and local banks continue to nd a market among such small rms. Lastly, it shows
why this bias can be stronger in developing countries.
A nal observation is that cream skimming by foreign banks can be rationalized if
one denes cream-skimming as capturing market segments of higher (average) quality.
However, cream-skimming interpreted as the poaching of only high-quality borrowers
in a given market segment is not an equilibrium in this framework. On the contrary,
this essay suggests that entrants with a cost advantage have to engage in costly
screening only for the better rms, not the high-risk ones.
Appendix
Proofs
The outlines of the proofs for Lemmas 1-3, Propositions 1-2, and the description
of equilibria for situations where I  E are given below.
Proof of Lemma 1 Let us consider two contracts M and N o¤ered by the
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incumbent, where UMk = U
N
k with R
M
k > R
N
k , C
M
k < C
N
k and k = h; l. With
UMk = U
N
k , one obtains (1   k)(RMk   RNk ) = k(CNk   CMk ). Hence, Mk   Nk =
k(1   )(CNk   CMk ) > 0. Therefore, it must be true that Mk > Nk . Bank I will
always choose a contract that sets its collateral requirement to zero. It is easy to
show that Ik  0; k = h; l for all such contracts.
Proof of Lemma 2 Let us consider two menus of contracts where R^Eh > ~R
E
h
and C^Eh < ~C
E
h such that Uh(R^
E
h ; C^
E
h ) = Uh(
~REh ;
~CEh ). One can show that replacing
the menu [( ~REh ; ~C
E
h ); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] with the menu [(R^
E
h ; C^
E
h ); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] will (a) satisfy
the participation and incentive compatibility constraints for all borrowers and (b)
result in higher prots for the entrant (see Extended Appendix for details). Hence
the entrants o¤er sets collateral requirement of the high-risk borrower to zero; this
is true for both pooling and separating contracts (see footnote 14). Hence pooling
contracts are of the form (REP ; 0) where R
E
P 2 [RminP (E); Rh] and RminP (E) is given
by (5).
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) Suppose not. Let us consider the menu [(REh ; 0);
(REl ; C
E
l )] such that ICh is slack. One can nd another menu [(R
E
h ; 0); (R^
E
l ; C^
E
l )]
where R^El > ~R
E
l and C^
E
l <
~CEl such that Ul(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = Ul(R^
E
l ; C^
E
l ) and ICh binds.
Replacing menu [(REh ; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] with menu [(R
E
h ; 0); (R^
E
l ; C^
E
l )] results in higher
prots for Bank E (see Extended Appendix for details). (ii) holds because Bank E
can always choose to stay out. (iii). From (ii) it follows that if El < 0, then 
E
h > 0.
Removing contract (REl ; C
E
l ) means that l-types either go to the incumbent or they
choose the contract (REh ; 0) originally selected by the h-types. In both cases Bank
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Es prots are higher.
Proof of Proposition 1 (a) In order to ensure that both high-risk and low-risk
borrow from it, the entrants o¤er in ZES (
E)must yield at least U Ik . Consequently, the
menu [(REh ; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )] must be such that Uh(R
E
h ; 0)  Uh(R¯
I
h; 0) and Ul(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) 
Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0). First, I show that in any equilibrium where the entrant dominates the
incumbent, it must be true that Ul(REl ; C
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0). Suppose not. Then, it
must be the case that Ul(REl ; C
E
l ) > Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0). However, one can nd a (R^
E
l ; C^
E
l )
in ZES (
E) where REl < R^
E
l and C
E
l > C^
E
l such that Ul(R^
E
l ; C^
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0) and
Uh(R^
E
l ; C^
E
l ) = Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = Uh(R
E
h ; 0). Replacing the entrants menu [(R
E
h ; 0);
(REl ; C
E
l )] by [(R
E
h ; 0); (R^
E
l ; C^
E
l )] leads to unambiguously higher prots while ensuring
that low-risks accept the new contract. Therefore, the entrants o¤er must have
Ul(R^
E
l ; C^
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0).
When the entrant dominates, one can focus attention on contracts in ZES (
E) such
that Ul(REl ; C
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0).For all such contract o¤ers, increasing entrants prots
from high-risks (by raising REh ) implies lowering prots from low-risks (lowering R
E
l
and raising CEl ). Thus the entrants choice of optimal contract depends on .
Consider two such menus [( REh ; 0); ( R
E
l ;
CEl )] and [(R^
E
h ; 0); (R^
E
l ; C^
E
l )] such that
REl < R^
E
l , C
E
l > C^
E
l . It follows that R
E
h > R^
E
h . From Ul( R
E
l ;
CEl ) = Ul(R^
E
l ; C^
E
l ), one
gets
(1  l)( REl   R^El ) = l(C^El   CEl ).
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Also, Uh(R^El ; C^
E
l ) = Uh(R^
E
h ; 0) with Uh( R
E
l ;
CEl ) = Uh(
REh ; 0) implies
(1  h)( REh   R^Eh ) = (1  h)( REl   R^El ) + h( CEl   C^El ).
Hence, [( REh ; 0); ( R
E
l ;
CEl )] [(R^Eh ; 0); (R^El ; C^El )]= [( h l1 l ) (1 )(1 )l]( CEl  
C^El ).
RHS is positive for  > 1. Intuitively, the entrant charges a higher REh when the
proportion of high-risks in the population is high and (a) follows. Solving the last
two equations, one gets REl = C
E
l = 
I and the entrants prots are strictly positive
when [1  (1  )l]I > E and this gives us the cut-o¤ ~h;lS  
E
1 (1 )l . If 
I = ~h;lS ,
it follows that El (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = 0. With Bank I o¤ering (R¯
I
l ; 0), both banks run down
prots to zero prots and the low-risk borrower borrows from either bank.
(b) Finally, when I < ~h;lS it follows that 
E
l (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) < 0. In this situation, the
entrant is forced to revise its o¤er to [(R
¯
I
h; 0); (
~REl ;
~CEl )] such that 
E
l (
~REl ;
~CEl ) = 0.
But with Ul(REl ; C
E
l ) = Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0), Bank I revises its o¤er with
 
RIl ; 0

to the low-risk
borrower such that Ul
 
RIl ; 0

= Ul( ~R
E
l ;
~CEl ) < Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0). It follows that R
I
l >R¯
I
l , and
Bank I now makes positive prots from the low-risk borrower. Also, the entrants
o¤er to the high-risk borrower is (R
¯
I
h; 0) where R¯
I
h >R¯
E
h and the entrant makes positive
prots of the high-risk borrower. Thus, in this equilibrium, the high-risk borrower
borrows from Bank E while her low-risk counterpart borrows from Bank I (see Figure
1).
Proof of Proposition 2 First, for a pooling contract
 
REP ; 0

to hold, the entrant
has to ensure that it can capture the low-risk borrowers. Therefore, it must be true
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that R
¯
I
l > R
min
P , that is 
I > ( 1 
1 E )
E  ~1P (). For a pooling contract
 
REP ; 0

,
wherein Bank E captures all borrowers, one can show that REP = R¯
I
l . For R
E
P > R¯
I
l ,
Bank I can always undercut Bank Es o¤er to low-risks and for REP < R¯
I
l , Bank E
can increase prots by pooling at (R
¯
I
l ; 0). The entrant makes strictly positive prots
from all borrowers when R
¯
I
l > R¯
E
h . Conversely, if 
I  ( 1 l
1 h )
E, the entrant covers
expected losses from high-risks with prots from low-risks. Comparing the entrants
prots from pooling and separating contracts, one can show that the entrant chooses
the pooling contract only when   1 (see (12) in Appendix B). Note that, for
I  ~h;lS , the entrant gets the high-risk borrower only. Here comparing prots, gives
us the second cuto¤ ~2P ()  
E
1 ( 
1  )(
h l
1 l
)
, such that if I > ~2P (), the entrant pools
all borrowers. Note when  = 1, ~2P () = ~
h;l
S .
Equilibria where the incumbent dominates
When I  E, an equilibrium of the game has Bank E o¤ering the menu [(R
¯
I
h; 0);
(REl ; C
E
l )] in Z
E
S (
E) where El (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) = 0. The incumbents o¤ers (R¯
I
h; 0) to
Borrower-h and
 
RIl ; 0

to Borrower-l such that Ul
 
RIl ; 0

= Ul(R
E
l ; C
E
l ). Note that
if I < E, the incumbent captures all borrowers but if I = E, Borrower-h borrows
from either bank but Borrower-l borrows from the incumbent only.
Equilibria where the entrant screens all borrowers
Bank Es problem can be viewed as a principal facing agents under incomplete
information where the agentsoutside opportunities are determined by the max. util-
ities that Bank I can provide. Borrower goes to Bank E only if it o¤ers an incentive
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scheme yielding at least, maximum utility, U Ik , i.e., reservation utility in borrowers
IR constraint is now U Ik .
Max [(1  h)REh + hCEh   E] + (1  )[(1  l)REl + lCEl   E] (7)
subject to (1  h)(x REh )  hCEh  U Ih ; (8)
(1  l)(x REl )  lCEl  U Il ; (9)
(1  h)(x REh )  hCEh  (1  h)(x REl )  hCEl ; (10)
(1  l)(x REl )  lCEl  (1  l)(x REh )  lCEh (11)
The following results hold in equilibrium (i) the h-types are not required to put down
any collateral, CEh = 0; (ii) ICh (10) must bind and (iii) IRh (8) must bind. Now, the
constraints in (7) can be written in terms of a single constraint in CEl as follows
0  Cl 
UIl
1 l  
UIh
1 h
h
1 h   L1 l
= I .
This gives the optimal separating contracts for the entrant as
REh;S =
I
1  h = R¯
I
h, C
E
h;S = 0; and R
E
l;S = 
I , CEl;S = 
I .
Bank E leaves both types of borrowers at U Ik the maximum Bank I bank can give
borrowers. Moreover, Bank Es expected prots from high-risks (Eh ) and low-risks
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(El )are given by
Eh = 
I   E and El = [1  (1  )l] I   E:
Bank Is prots from providing each borrower U Ik , are zero. For both borrower types
to accept loan contracts from Bank E only, its prots must be strictly positive, i.e.,
I > [1  (1  )l]I > E. For Bank Es optimal pooling contracts are
REP =
I
1  l = R¯
I
l , C
E
P = 0.
Given Bank E o¤ers the pooling contract (R
¯
I
l ; 0) its prots from low and high-risks
are given by
El;P = 
I   E and Eh;P = (
1  h
1  l )
I   E:
Bank E makes strictly positive prots from all borrowers when (1 h
1 l )
I > E, i.e.
when R
¯
I
l >R¯
E
h . BankE chooses the pooling contract when
E
P (R
I
l ; 0)  ES [(R¯
I
h; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )],
that is, when
  (1  )l (1  l)
(h   l)  (1  )2l
.
Note that, when Bank E o¤ers a separating contract, its prots from loans to the
high-risk borrower are higher than prots from loans to low-risk borrowers. The
converse is true for a pooling contract.
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CHAPTER III
PROBLEM OF ENTRANT BANKS IN AVOIDING BAD RISKS
Introduction
Banks obtain information during their relationships with borrowers that helps
them distinguish creditworthy customers from non-creditworthy ones. Consequently,
they may o¤er prohibitively expensive terms or simply refuse to re-lend to the non-
creditworthy borrowers after learning that they are bad risks. While this implies
that such borrowers are likely to be denied loans from their current banks, they may
choose to apply for loans from other (new) banks in the future.
This has important implications for entry into credit markets. Incumbent banks
gain knowledge about borrower quality from previous lending relationships. So their
lending rates to existing customers are adjusted according to the customers credit
risk. In addition, incumbents are likely to have identied a section of the borrower
population as "bad-risk" borrowers whose likelihood of default is so high that it is not
protable to lend to them at any rate.26 The previous chapter examined a problem of
entry in which the entrant and the incumbent compete over the incumbents clients.
Accordingly, for both incumbent and entrant, all borrowers are known to be credit-
worthy. The entrant bank uses collateral as a screening device to sort creditworthy
borrowers of high-quality from those of low-quality.
26I classify uncreditworthy borrowers as "bad-risks" as opposed to "good-risk" borrowers that are
creditworthy. Within the category of good-risk borrowers, I then classify borrowers as high-quality
(or "low-risk") and low quality (or "high-risk") just like in the previous chapter.
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In this chapter, I examine a similar problem of competition between entrant and
incumbent banks, in which the incumbents information advantage extends to non-
creditworthy borrowers as well. Accordingly, I assume that the incumbent also has
knowledge about "prospective" non-creditworthy borrowers from previous transac-
tions. Thus, not only does the entrant have to sort creditworthy borrowers of di¤erent
risk quality, it also has to avoid lending to non-creditworthy borrowers. Here, too,
the entrant uses collateral to screen out bad risks and to sort high-risk borrowers
from low-risk ones.27 The uninformed lender o¤ers di¤erent loan contracts by vary-
ing repayment and collateral requirements on the loan. Borrowers that belong to a
superior type select loans with a higher collateral requirement in exchange for a lower
repayment because they have a lower probability of defaulting on the loan.
The results of this "extended" model are discussed in reference to the "benchmark"
model in the previous chapter.28 An important feature of the benchmark model is
that the ability of the entrant to gain borrowers of superior quality increases with (1)
its cost advantage over the incumbent and (2) the average quality of borrowers in the
pool. The rst result follows from the fact that the entrant can screen high-quality
(low-risk) borrowers only if it has a su¢ ciently large cost advantage over its rival. The
second result follows from the fact that the entrant can pool borrowers in markets of
superior average quality (higher proportion of low risks in the population).
27It is important to mention that the mechanism of screening is the same for all borrowers.
Banerjee (2005) distinguishes between the two forms of screening technology: a banks ability to
screen in creditworthy projects and a banks ability to screen out unproductive projects as being
non-creditworthy.
28For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the model in the previous chapter as the benchmark
model and the model presented here as the extendedmodel.
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With the introduction of bad-risk types, both results can change. Firstly, note
that even if the entrant can screen high risks from low risks (within the category of
creditworthy borrowers); it may fail to screen the non-creditworthy borrowers from
those that are creditworthy. Consequently, if the proportion of bad risks in the
population is large enough, the entrant may not break even from a menu of contracts
that simply sort high risks from low-risk types.
Secondly, in the benchmark model, the relation between the (average) quality
of the borrower-pool and the entrants ability to attract borrowers of higher quality
is monotonic. A greater proportion of low risks (and therefore, an increase in the
average quality) increases the entrants ability to capture them by pooling them with
high-risk types. With the introduction of bad risks in the population, this relationship
turns out to be non-monotonic (as in the extended model given below). For a given
level of bad risks, if the proportion of the high risks is small, the entrant can pool
them with low risks. On the other hand, if a large proportion of borrowers are high
risks, they can be pooled with bad risks. In contrast, if the proportion of high risks
is neither too large nor too small, pooling contracts may no longer be feasible. In
particular, if it is also the case that the entrant cannot screen the high-risk types,
then the incumbent dominates despite the entrants cost advantage. Thus, for low
cost advantages, the entrant gains market share if the proportion of high risks is either
low or high, while the incumbent dominates for intermediate values. Accordingly, the
entrants ability to gain market share, rst declines and then rises with increases in
average borrower-quality.
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Non-monotonicity results in extending the number of agent types to three is not
uncommon in asymmetric information setups. Feltovich et. al (2002) show that in
signalling environments, while medium types choose to distinguish themselves from
low-types, high-types may choose not to signal or "countersignal" to distinguish them-
selves from medium-types. An important feature of their model is that the signal
is not the only information available on types: information is available from other
"noisy" signals. The noise in such signals compel the mediocre to signal and di¤eren-
tiate themselves from the low. But the high choose not to signal out of the concern
that doing so would only reveal them as mediocre. In this model however, the non-
monotonicity result arises due to variations in the proportions of types in the model.
In the absence of a screening (or signalling) mechanism, a principal can pool agents
(and thereby gain market share) if the proportion of the medium type in the pool
is either su¢ ciently high or su¢ ciently low. However for intermediate ranges of the
medium type, the principal loses market share because it fails to bunch them either
with the high or with the low-types.
Preliminaries
The basic setup is similar to the benchmark model. Entrepreneurs (also called
borrowers) with unlimited access to collateral can borrow a dollar from a bank and
invest in a project. The project returns x if it succeeds (with probability 1  ) and
zero if it fails (with probability ). Banksloan contracts consist of a repayment R
and a collateral requirement C. Borrowersreservation utility and lenderscost of
funds are denoted by U0 and , respectively. A lender can recover only a fraction 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of the collateral which the borrower loses when he/she defaults on the loan. Thus,
the parameter  is a measure of the disparity in the borrower and lender valuation
of collateral. Both lenders and borrowers are risk neutral. Banksprots from the
loan contract (R;C) is given by (R;C; ) = (1   )R + C    while a borrowers
payo¤s under the same contract is U(R;C; ) = (1   )(x   R)   C. Therefore, a
loan contract (R;C) generates a social surplus of [(1 )x  U0] (1 )C. Note
that a strictly positive collateral requirement entails a deadweight loss of (1   )C
implying that ceteris paribus, zero-collateral loan contracts are rst-best.
The model assumes a xed pool of borrowers indexed by their risk parameter ,
the probability of default. The fraction l of entrepreneurs are low-risk types ( = l),
the fraction h of borrowers are high-risk ( = h) and the fraction b are bad-risk
types ( = b) with 0 < l < h < b < 1 and h + l + b = 1. In short, this
chapter extends the model in Chapter 1 by introducing a third borrower-type: bad-
risk. A bad-risk borrower is non-creditworthy in that the surplus generated on loans
to him/her is strictly negative (i.e., (1   b)x <  + U0, for all ). Recall that in
Chapter 1, both high-risk and low-risk borrowers were creditworthy (or "good"-risk)
in that all loan contracts generated a positive social surplus (i.e. (1  k)x >  +U0,
where k = h; l). Stated di¤erently, a bank with complete information would always
extend loans to good risks and deny credit to bad risks.
In this familiar setting, this essay analyzes competition between an incumbent
that has complete information about borrower-creditworthiness and an entrant that
is unable to distinguish between borrowersrisk-types. The incumbent (or Bank I)
is (pre-entry) a price-setting monopolist whose cost of funds is I . The entrant (or
48
Bank E) is an outside bank whose cost of funds is E. As mentioned before, the
key di¤erence between the setup here and that in the previous chapter is that the
incumbents private information here extends not only to its existing (and therefore)
creditworthy clients but also to other "prospective" non-creditworthy borrowers that
the entrant would like to avoid. Bank js o¤er to borrower k is denoted by (Rjk; C
j
k)
where j = I; E and k = b; h; l. The banks prots from this o¤er are given by jk
=(1 k)Rjk+kCjk j if the borrower accepts the loan contract and zero otherwise.
Thus its overall prot is written as j  bjb + hjh + ljl .
After eliminating a set of dominated strategies for each bank, I describe the set of
contracts that each bank can o¤er in equilibrium. For the incumbent bank the result
is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma For borrowers of type k = b, the incumbent bank denies credit.
For borrowers of type k = h; l the incumbent o¤ers a contract from the set ZIk(
I) =
f(RIk; 0) : RIk 2 [R¯
I
k(
I); Rk]g where R¯
I
k(
I) = 
I
1 k and
Rk = x  U01 k are the rst-best
(zero-collateral) minimum and maximum repayments respectively.
Since the entrant denies credit to all bad risks, they continue to receive their
reservation payo¤ U0. Also, the contract (R
¯
I
k(
I); 0) yields borrower k the maximum
utility Bank I can provide, denoted U Ik (
I), and is dened by
U Ik (
I)  (1  k)x  I , k = h; l. (12)
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The entrant bank faces borrowers with two di¤erent types of participation con-
straints. For good risks (k = (h; l)), the participation constraints are determined
by the payo¤s that the borrowers receive from loan contracts o¤ered by the incum-
bent (i.e.,U Ik ) . For bad risks however, the participation constraint is given by U
0,
the reservation utility of the borrower (the opportunity cost of his/her time). The
entrants o¤ers can be summarized in terms of the following Lemma.
Result (a) The entrant does not require the bad-risk borrower to secure loans
with collateral, i.e., Cb = 0. Therefore, contracts that pool bad risks with other
borrower-types are zero-collateral contracts. (b) Contracts that sort adjacent borrower
types require that the local incentive constraints of the inferior type bind in equilib-
rium. (c) Overall expected prots from contract o¤ers are non-negative. Finally,
expected prots from loans to low-risk types are non-negative.
Result (a) is standard in the principal agent literature. Result (b) follows from
the fact that (under competition) inferior types try to mimic superior types and the
uninformed principal will always choose to o¤er incentive schemes that are just as
good as their outside alternative. Finally (c) follows from (b) because the low-risk
type is the best quality borrower. If prots from a contract to low risks are negative,
the entrant can remove this contract o¤er without a¤ecting the incentive constraints
for other types.
The timing of the game is similar to the model in Chapter 1. I focus exclusively
on pure strategy equilibria. To derive a characterization of equilibria, I hold the
entrants cost of funds constant at E and vary the incumbents cost of funds I .
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As is standard in the principal-agent literature, I will assume that if the borrower is
indi¤erent between two loan contracts o¤ered by the same bank, she chooses the one
that the bank prefers. Also, if a borrower is indi¤erent between contracts o¤ered by
the incumbent and the entrant, in equilibrium she borrows from the bank that makes
higher prots from the contract.
Candidate Equilibria
This section begins with a description of the candidate equilibrium for a particular
case of this problem, namely the situation in which the entrant bank screens all
borrowers. Following this, I describe other candidate equilibria of the model. As will
be evident, it is di¢ cult to provide an analytical solution to this model. Therefore,
in the next section, numerical examples are used to determine the conditions under
which the candidates (described below) emerge as the equilibria of the model.
Bank E can successfully sort all borrowers only if its incentive scheme yields each
borrower at least as much utility as contracts o¤ered by Bank I. Consequently, Bank
E faces borrowers whose reservation utilities are determined by the maximum utility
that Bank I can o¤er borrowers. These reservation utilities for the high- and low-risk
borrower, namely U Ih and U
I
l , are shown by the indi¤erence curves through (R¯
I
h; 0)
and (R
¯
I
l ; 0) in Figure 3. Figure 3 illustrates the (candidate) equilibria in (R;C) space.
Borrowerspayo¤s increase as one moves southwest, while lendersprots increase
going northeast. Note that since the incumbent denies credit to the bad risks, their
reservation utility is U0 (i.e., U Ib = U
0). This is shown in Figure 3 by the (bold)
indi¤erence curve through ( Rb; 0), where Rb = x   U01 b , is the minimum repayment
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Figure 3: Entrants o¤ers under di¤erent equilibria in (R;C) space: Borrowerspayo¤s increase as
one moves southwest, while lendersprots increase going northeast. The entrant o¤ers (R
¯
I
l ; 0) and
(R
¯
I
h; 0) in Pool-1 and Pool-2 respectively. For Hybrid-1, the entrant pools bad-risks and high-risks
at (R
¯
I
h; 0) and sorts low-risks at (R
E
l ; C
E
l ). For Hybrid-2, the entrant screens out bad-risks at
( Rb; 0) and pools good-risks at (R
E
g ; C
E
g ). Finally, the entrant screens high-risk at (R
E
h ; C
E
h ) for
Screen-1 and low-risks at (REl ; C
E
l ) for Screen-2.
at which the bad-risk types reject the entrants o¤er.
A rst candidate (screening) equilibrium, denoted as Screen-1, is one where the en-
trant screens all borrower types. The entrant o¤ers contract menu f( Rb; 0); (REh ; CEh );
(REl ; C
E
l )g. The incumbent o¤ers (R¯
I
h; 0) to high risks, (R¯
I
l ; 0) to low risks and denies
credit to bad-risk types. The bad-risk borrowers reject the entrants o¤er of ( Rb; 0).
The good-risk types (both h and l) borrow from the entrant, accepting loan contracts
with strictly positive collateral requirements. The contract o¤ers to high- and low
risks are shown as pointsA andB in Figure 3: the contract for low-risk borrowers have
a lower repayment and a higher collateral requirement than that for high-risk borrow-
ers. Note that local incentive constraints (i.e., incentive constraints for adjacent types)
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bind in equilibrium. Thus Ub( Rb; 0) = Ub(REh ; C
E
h ) and Uh(R
E
h ; C
E
h ) = Uh(R
E
l ; C
E
l ) in
a screening equilibrium.
More important, this candidate equilibrium is feasible only if the entrants cost of
funds is su¢ ciently large so that two screening cuto¤s (one for each pair of adjacent
types) are satised. The rst cuto¤ is ~b;hS for screening the bad-risk types from the
high-risk types and the second is ~h;lS for screening the high-risk types from the low-
risk types. Evidently, the second cuto¤ is identical to the screening cuto¤ discussed
in Chapter 1. Furthermore, as shown in the appendix, the screening cuto¤s are
independent of the distribution of borrower types in the population and are given by
~h;lS =
1
1  (1  )l
E
~b;hS =
b   h
b(1  h)  h(1  b)
E +
(1  )h(1  h)
b(1  h)  h(1  b) [(1  b)x  U
0]
Therefore, to screen all borrower types the entrants cost advantage needs to be
su¢ ciently large, that is, it must be true that I > max(~b;hS ; ~
h;l
S ).
However if ~h;lS > 
I  ~b;hS , the entrant cannot screen low-risk types. But the
entrant can still screen the high risks from bad risks. This gives us a second candidate
(screening) equilibrium denoted as Screen-2, where the entrant screens only high risks.
Here, the entrants o¤er is given by f( Rb; 0); (REh ; CEh ); (R1l ; C1l )g where El (R1l ; C1l ) =
0. The incumbent denies loans to bad risks and o¤ers (R
¯
I
h; 0) and (R
I
l ; 0)g to high-
and low risks respectively, such that Ul(R1l ; C
1
l ) = Ul(R
I
l ; 0). Except for low-risk
types, the equilibrium behavior of agents in Screen-2 is similar to that in Screen-1.
In Screen-2, low risks borrow from the incumbent whose prots from low-risk types
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are strictly positive.
Alternatively, if ~b;hS > 
I  ~h;lS , then neither screening equilibrium described
above is feasible. Given that the entrant can still sort the low-risk types, it follows
that a third candidate (hybrid) equilibrium is possible in this situation, denoted as
Hybrid-1. In general, a hybrid equilibrium can be described as one in which the
uninformed principal pools or bunches o¤ers to adjacent types while screening the
other type(s). In Hybrid-1, the entrant seeks to pool bad risks with high risks while
screening low-risk types. It o¤ers the menu f(R
¯
I
h; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l )g while the incumbents
o¤ers are the same as that in Screen-1. In equilibrium, all borrowers would go to the
entrant whose aggregate prots would depend on the distribution of bad risks in
the population. With I  ~h;lS , its prots from loans to low risks is non-negative.
However, by pooling bad risks with high risks, the entrant can no longer ensure
strictly positive prots from its o¤er of (R
¯
I
h; 0) unless the proportion of bad risks in
the population is su¢ ciently small. I return to this point below in my discussion of
pooling equilibria.
A fourth candidate (hybrid) equilibrium, denoted as Hybrid-2, involves bunching
good risks and screening them from bad risks. Here, the entrant o¤ers f( Rb; 0); (REg ; CEg )g
where (REg ; C
E
g ) is shown by the pointC in Figure 3. Note that Ub( Rb; 0) = Ub(R
E
g ; C
E
g )
and Ul(R¯
I
l ; 0) = Ul(R
E
g ; C
E
g ). Again, the incumbents o¤er are the same as that in
Screen-1, the bad-risk borrowers reject the entrants o¤er of ( Rb; 0) and the good-
risk types (both h and l) borrow from the entrant. Note that the entrants o¤er in
Hybrid-2 involves pooling, and therefore is feasible only if the proportion of high
risks in the population is su¢ ciently small. Hybrid-2 is feasible for the entrant only
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if I  ~Y (h; l), where ~Y (h; l) denotes the hybrid-cuto¤ for the entrant.
The last two candidate equilibria involve pooling contracts. In Pool-1, the entrant
pools all borrowers by o¤ering (R
¯
I
l ; 0). This cross-subsidizes losses from bad risks and
high risks with prots from low risks. Therefore, Pool-1 is feasible only when the
proportion of low risks in the population is high and this is denoted by the cuto¤
~1P (h; l). The entrant can also pool bad risks with high risks. This is given by
Pool-2, where the entrant o¤ers (R
¯
I
h; 0) and the feasible cuto¤ for such a contract
is given by ~2P (b; h). The set of contract o¤ers by the entrant for each of the six
candidate equilibria are given in Table 2.
In summary, there are three categories of candidate equilibria: pooling, screening
and hybrid. Within each category, the rst candidate has a larger number of customer
types going to the entrant for loans than the second. For example, in candidate
equilibrium Hybrid-2, the entrant screens out the bad-risk but in Hybrid-1 it pools
them with high risks. Also, note that if the entrant can screen the low-risk borrower
(i.e., if I  ~h;lS ), then the entrants prots from o¤ers in Screen-1 dominate those
from o¤ers in Screen-2. Similarly, the entrants o¤ers in Hybrid-1 dominate those in
Pool-2. Finally, note that the incumbent dominates if I is strictly lower than all of
the break-even cuto¤s given in the last column of Table 2.
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Table 2. Entrant o¤ers under di¤erent candidate equilibria
Candidate Prot Customer types Contract Break-even
Equilibria borrowing from E menu cuto¤
Pool-1 1P (b; h; l) (R¯
I
l ; 0) ~
1
P
Pool-2 2P (b; h) (R¯
I
h; 0) ~
2
P
Screen-1 1S (h); (l) (
Rb; 0); (R
E
h ; C
E
h ); (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) ~
b;h
S , ~
h;l
S
Screen-2 2S (h) (
Rb; 0); (R
E
h ; C
E
h ); (R
1
l ; C
1
l ) ~
b;h
S
Hybrid-1 1Y (b; h); (l) (R¯
I
h; 0); (R
E
l ; C
E
l ) ~
1
P , ~
h;l
S
Hybrid-2 2Y (h; l) (
Rb; 0); (R
E
g ; C
E
g ) ~Y
Numerical Examples
In this section, I use numerical examples to solve for the equilibrium using di¤erent
sets of parameter values. The aim of the exercise is to derive conditions under which
the candidates listed in Table 2 emerge as the equilibrium of the model. The entrants
prots are calculated under each candidate equilibrium for each point in the parameter
space. The candidate equilibrium in which the entrant maximizes prots emerges as
the actual equilibrium (at that point in the parameter space).
Note that for b = 0, the extended model is identical to the benchmark model
(Chapter 1). Therefore, I rst solve the problem numerically for b = 0 to replicate
Figure 4 of Chapter 1. This is shown in Figure 4, where the regions of equilibria are
shown in (h; I) space. Parameter values of x = 16, U0 = 2, b = 0:7, h = 0:4,
l = 0:2 and E = 4:3 are used to generate Figure 4. This is done for both  = 0:35
and  = 0:65 to show how the screening cuto¤for low risks ~h;lS changes with . Clearly,
the regions are identical to the ones derived in Chapter 1. To simplify exposition,
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Figure 4: The extended model with no bad-risk types: With no bad-risks (b = 0), the extended
model is identical to the benchmark model. The graphs are drawn to parameter values x = 16,
U0 = 2, b = 0:7, h = 0:4, l = 0:2 for b = 0; 
E = 4:3 and I = [2:8, 5:6]. Note that for
(a)  = 0:35; ~b;hS = 4:56, ~
h;l
S = 4:94 while for (b)  = 0:65; ~
b;h
S = 4:46, ~
h;l
S = 4:62.
this diagram is used as a reference to describe how the equilibrium changes with the
introduction of bad risks in the model.
It can be shown that the results in Chapter 1 are fairly robust even with the
introduction of the bad risks in the model. Using the same parameter values (as given
above), a di¤erent set of (four) graphs are generated in Figure 5, for b = 0:1 and for
b = 0:3. The results show that even after introducing bad risks, the equilibrium is
similar to that in Figure 4. With a high cost-advantage, the entrant either pools high-
and low risks (for low h) or it screens all borrowers (for high h). When the entrants
cost advantage is low, it can screen only high risks but not low risks. The di¤erence
between this case (b > 0) and the previous case (b = 0) lies in the fact that now the
entrant screens out bad risks. Therefore, the equilibrium contracts are now di¤erent:
in Figure 5, candidates Screen-1, Screen-2 and Hybrid-2 replace Hybrid-1, Pool-2 and
Pool-1 respectively, but it is not di¢ cult to see that the new equilibrium has features
similar to that in Figure 4.
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Figure 5: Equilibria (with bad-risk types) similar to the benchmark model: The graphs are
drawn to parameter values x = 16, U0 = 2, b = 0:7, h = 0:4, l = 0:2 for E = 4:3
and I = [2:8, 5:6]. The value of b varies from 0:1 in (a) to 0:3 in (d). Note that for (a)
and (b)  = 0:35; ~b;hS = 4:56, ~
h;l
S = 4:94 while for (c) and (d)  = 0:65; ~
b;h
S = 4:46,
~h;lS = 4:62.
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A closer look at the candidate equilibria in Table 2 reveals two types of costs for
the entrant. The rst type arises from costs of cross-subsidization in pooling di¤er-
ent types of borrowers. In contracts where the uninformed principal pools di¤erent
types, prots from superior types are used to cover losses from inferior ones. Pooling
costs increase with the proportion of inferior types in the pool, and therefore, these
contracts are used only when the borrower population has a su¢ ciently large pro-
portion that belong to the superior type. The second type includes screening costs
that arise because of the expected deadweight losses in liquidating collateral. This
cost increases with decreases in . Note however that numerically these costs are
quite low and the screening cuto¤s are not much higher than E. Therefore screening
equilibria dominate in the numerical examples discussed above.
However, important changes in the equilibrium are observed for low numerical
values of E. Low values of E reduce the costs of pooling and give rise to situations
where pooling candidates emerge as the equilibria in the model. One such example
is given by the same parameter values as in the previous example, but for E = 3:6.
Four subplots of equilibrium regions are shown for b = 0:1; 0:15; 0:2 and 0:3 in Figure
6. The dotted line in the graphs denote the entrants cost of funds. The regions of
the parameter space where the incumbent dominates are shown in white.
A similar subplot of the four equilibrium regions is given in Figure 7 for a di¤erent
set of parameter values: x = 21, U0 = 3, b = 0:8, h = 0:4, l = 0:2 and E = 1:4.
The subplots correspond to the same set of values of b = 0:1; 0:15; 0:2 and 0:3. The
key di¤erence between Figure 6 and Figure 7 lies in the screening cuto¤s: the low-risk
screening cuto¤ (~h;lS ) is strictly greater than the bad-risk cuto¤ (~
b;h
S ) in Figure 6,
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Figure 6: Equilibria when the entrants cost is small (Case I : ~h;lS > ~
b;h
S ). The graphs are drawn
to parameter values x = 16, U0 = 2, b = 0:7, h = 0:4, l = 0:2 for  = 0:25, 
E = 3:6 and
I = [2:8, 5:6]. Note that , ~h;lS = 4:94 > ~
b;h
S = 4:56, so that Bank E can screen high-risks as
in Screen-1. The value of b varies from 0:1 in (a) to 0:3 in (d).
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Figure 7: Equilibria when the entrants cost is small (Case II: ~h;lS < ~
b;h
S ). The graphs are drawn
to parameter values x = 21, U0 = 3, b = 0:8, h = 0:4, l = 0:2 for  = 0:15, 
E = 1:4
and I = [1:2, 3:6]. Note that , ~h;lS = 1:72 > ~
b;h
S = 1:69, so that Bank E cannot screen
high-risks as in Screen-1. The value of b varies from 0:1 in (a) to 0:3 in (d).
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while the opposite is true for Figure 7. As discussed below, this leads to di¤erences
in the equilibrium behavior of the entrant in these two situations. In what follows,
I discuss features of the equilibrium for both Figure 6 and Figure 7 in terms of the
four sub-cases given below.
Case (i) I < minf~b;hS ; ~h;lS g. Since the entrant cannot screen any of the good-
risk types, the discussion here will focus attention on the following three candidates:
Pool-1, Pool-2 and Hybrid-2. Importantly, both gures show that the incumbent can
dominate in regions even if the entrant has the cost advantage (i.e., regions above
the dotted line). This feature departs from the equilibrium in the benchmark case
(Figure 4) because, unlike in the previous case, it is costly for the entrant to secure
the high-risk borrower. Such pooling costs are prohibitive for (a) very small cost
advantages of the entrant and (b) a very high proportion of bad risk types in the
population. Thus for either (a) or (b) or both, the entrant dominates as shown in
Figures 6 and 7.
However, if the proportion of bad-risk types is su¢ ciently small (i.e., b = 0:1
or 0:15), pooling contracts are available to the entrant as shown in Figures 6(a)-(b)
and 7(a)-(b). For low values of h, the proportion of low risks is large so that the
entrant either pools all borrowers or pools the good risks while screening them from
bad risks. Thus, one of Pool-1 and Hybrid-2 emerges as the equilibrium. The cuto¤
for Hybrid-2, ~Y (h; l), is increasing and convex in h. A higher cost advantage is
needed for pooling a larger proportion of high risks in the population. Candidate
Hybrid-2 dominates Pool-1 for higher b because a larger proportion of bad risks
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implies that it is now more protable to screen them than it is to pool them with
good risks.
On the other hand, if the proportion of high risks in the population is large, the
entrant can pool them with bad-risk and Pool-2 is the equilibrium for large values of
h. An interesting feature of the equilibrium in these regions is that, while pooling
is feasible for high or low values of h, the incumbent dominates for intermediate
values of h. This happens in situations where the proportion of high-risk is neither
to large to be pooled with bad risks nor too small to be pooled with low risks. In
these regions the entrant would ideally like to screen high risks, but is unable to do
so since I < ~b;hS .
Case (ii) ~b;hS < 
I < ~h;lS . This situation arises in Figure 6 but not in Figure 7.
For low values of b, the equilibrium is similar to that in the previous case. Pool-1
and Hybrid-1 emerge as the equilibrium for low h whereas Pool-2 is the equilibrium
at high h. But whereas earlier the incumbent dominated at intermediate values of
h, the entrant can now capture the high-risk market by screening high risks from
bad risks. This is shown by the region labeled Screen-2 in Figure 6. Note that the
size of this region increases (at the expense of Pool-2 ) with increases in b because
pooling higher proportions of bad risks is no longer protable as it increases costs of
cross-subsidization. Therefore for higher values of b, pooling equilibria are replaced
by Screen-1 (for high h) and Hybrid-2 (for low h).
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Case (iii) ~b;hS > 
I > ~h;lS . This situation arises in Figure 7 but not in Figure 6. As
mentioned earlier, the entrant cannot screen high risks but can now use contracts in
Hybrid-1 where it bunches bad risks with high risks while sorting low-risk types. Note
that this contract dominates the entrants o¤ers in Pool-2 for I > ~h;lS . Therefore, for
high h, Hybrid-1 replaces Pool-2 as shown in Figures 7(a)-(c). Obviously, the region
labeled Hybrid-1 shrinks with increases in b because pooling higher proportions of
bad risks increases costs of cross-subsidization. For low h, the equilibrium is given
by Hybrid-2 as in the previous case. However, unlike the previous case, the entrant
cannot screen high risks for the intermediate values of h. Nor can it pool high
risks, either with low risks or with bad risks. As a result the incumbent continues to
dominate in this intermediate region.
Case (iv) I > max(~b;hS ; ~
h;l
S ). This implies that the complete set of contracts listed
in Table 2 yield strictly positive prots to the entrant. Among them, the entrants
o¤ers in Pool-1 and Screen-1 are dominated by those in Hybrid-1 and Screen-2 re-
spectively. Therefore, the entrant can choose between contract o¤ers in the four
alternatives: Pool-1, Screen-2, Hybrid-1 and Hybrid-2. Clearly, for high cost advan-
tages of the entrant, Hybrid-2 and Screen-1 dominate because they not only screen
out the bad risks but also include low-risk types. Note however, that entrant o¤ers in
Hybrid-1 continue to dominate Screen-1 for high h despite the fact that the entrant
can now screen high risks from bad risks. This is probably because the cost of cross
subsidization are still less than screening costs for high h.
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Conclusion
The model presented in this chapter shows how an incumbent banks knowledge
about the (un)creditworthiness of its (previous) customers in addition to that of its
existing clients a¤ects the behavior of entrants into credit markets. An important
result here is that with a low cost advantage, the entrants ability to gain market
share rst decreases, and then increases, with increases in (average) borrower qual-
ity. Although the entrant gains market share in high- as well as low-average-quality
markets, the incumbent dominates in markets at intermediate levels of (average) bor-
rower quality. The rationale behind this result is simple: the entrants information
disadvantage is less if either low risks or high risks dominate the borrower pool. On
the other hand, this disadvantage is very high if there is an equal probability of com-
ing across either creditworthy type. In this situation, the entrant has to engage in
costly screening. However, for low-cost advantages, the entrants screening costs are
prohibitive and the incumbent dominates despite its cost disadvantage.
This non-monotonicity result is di¤erent from situations in which the entrant can
costlessly screen out bad risks, as in the benchmark model. There, the entrant can
conrm that any customer coming to it for loans is creditworthy. Therefore, its
cost advantage is su¢ cient to obtain at least the inferior type from among the pool
of creditworthy borrowers. And, as average borrower quality increases, the entrant
nds that it can pool borrowers of inferior quality with superior ones. Accordingly,
the entrants ability to gain market share increases monotonically with increases in
borrower quality.
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Appendix
Entrants o¤er in Screen-1
The following results are obtained for I > max(~b;hS ; ~
h;l
S ). The entrants optimiza-
tion problem is given as follows:
max E  bEb + hEh + lEl
where Ek =(1 k)REk +kCEk  E, subject to the following participation constraints
Ub(Rb; Cb)  U0 (13)
Uh(Rh; Ch)  U Ih (14)
Ul(Rl; Cl)  U Il (15)
and the following incentive compatibility constraints
Ub(Rb; Cb)  Ub(Rh; Ch) (16)
Ub(Rb; Cb)  Ub(Rl; Cl) (17)
Uh(Rh; Ch)  Uh(Rb; Cb) (18)
Uh(Rh; Ch)  Uh(Rl; Cl) (19)
Ul(Rl; Cl)  Ul(Rb; Cb) (20)
Ul(Rl; Cl)  Ul(Rh; Ch): (21)
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Claim 1 In any solution, Cb = 0.
Suppose not. Let f(R1b ; C1b ); (Rh; Ch); (Rl; Cl)g be a solution. Consider contract
(R2b ; C
2
b ) where R
2
b > R
1
b , C
2
b < C
1
b such that
Ub(R
1
b ; C
1
b ) = Ub(R
2
b ; C
2
b ): (22)
It can be shown that the uninformed lender can increase prots by replacing
contract (R1b ; C
1
b ) with contract (R
2
b ; C
2
b ). Note that since (R
1
b ; C
1
b ) satises (13), (4)
and (5), so does (R2b ; C
2
b ). For (R
2
b ; C
2
b ) to satisfy (7), it needs to be shown that
Uh(R
1
b ; C
1
b )  Uh(R2b ; C2b ). That is, (1  h)(R2b  R1b)  h(C1b   C2b ). Using (22), we
get
(
1  h
h
)(R2b  R1b)  (C1b   C2b ) = (
1  b
b
)(R2b  R1b)
which holds true, since b > h. Similarly, (9) is also satised. Moreover,
b(R
1
b ; C
1
b )  b(R2b ; C2b ) = (1  b)(R2b  R1b) + b(C2b   C1b )
= (1  )(1  b)(R2b  R1b) > 0: [using (22)]
Claim 2 In any solution, the incentive constraint of the bad-risk w.r.t the
high-risk must bind, that is Ub(Rb; 0) = Ub(Rh; Ch).
Suppose not. Let f(Rb; 0); (R1h; C1h); (Rl; Cl)g be a solution. Consider contract
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(R2h; C
2
h) where R
2
h > R
1
h, C
2
h < C
1
h such that
Ub(Rb; 0) = Ub(R
2
h; C
2
h) (23)
Uh(R
1
h; C
1
h) = Uh(R
2
h; C
2
h): (24)
It can be shown that the uninformed lender can increase prots by replacing
contract (R1h; C
1
h) with contract (R
2
h; C
2
h). Note that since (R
1
b ; C
1
b ) satises (2), (7)
and (8), so does (R2h; C
2
h). For (R
2
h; C
2
h) to satisfy (10), it needs to be shown that
Ul(R
1
h; C
1
h)  Ul(R2h; C2h). That is, (1   l)(R2h   R1h)  l(C1h   C2h). Using (24), we
get
(
1  l
l
)(R2h  R1h)  (C1h   C2h) = (
1  h
h
)(R2h  R1h)
which holds true, since b > h. Similarly, (9) is also satised. Moreover,
h(R
2
h; C
2
h)  h(R1h; C1h)
= (1  h)(R2h  R1h) + h(C2h   C1h)
= (1  )(1  h)(R2h  R1h) > 0: [using (24)]
Claim 3 In any solution, the incentive constraint of the high-risk w.r.t the
low-risk must bind, that is Uh(Rh; Ch) = Uh(Rl; Cl).
Suppose not. Let f(Rb; 0); (Rh; Ch); (R1l ; C1l )g be a solution. Consider contract
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(R2l ; C
2
l ) where R
2
l > R
1
l , C
2
l < C
1
l such that
Uh(Rh; Ch) = Uh(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) (25)
Ul(R
1
l ; C
1
l ) = Ul(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) (26)
It can be shown that the uninformed lender can increase prots by replacing
contract (R1l ; C
1
l ) with contract (R
2
l ; C
2
l ). Note that since (R
1
l ; C
1
l ) satises (3), (9)
and (10), so does (R2l ; C
2
l ).
It can be shown that (R2l ; C
2
l ) satises (5). Suppose not. Then it follows that
Ub(Rb; 0) < Ub(R
2
l ; C
2
l ). Using Remark 2, this implies Ub(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) > Ub(Rb; 0) =
Ub(Rh; Ch). That is, (1  b)(Rh  R2l ) > b(C2l   Ch). From (25),
(
1  b
b
)(Rh  R2l ) > (C2l   Ch) = (
1  h
h
)(Rh  R2l )
which is impossible. Hence (5) must be true. Moreover,
l(R
2
l ; C
2
l )  l(R1l ; C1l )
= (1  l)(R2l  R1l ) + l(C2l   C1l )
= (1  )(1  l)(R2l  R1l ) > 0: [using (26)]
Claim 4 The participation constraints for both high- and low-risk borrowers
must bind.
Suppose not. Let f(Rb; 0); (R1h; C1h); (R1l ; C1l )g be a candidate solution such that
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Uh(R
1
h; C
1
h) >
U Ih and Ul(R
1
l ; C
1
l ) >
U Il . The aim here is to show that the solution
f(Rb; 0); (R2h; C2h); (R2l ; C2l )g for which
Uh(R
2
h; C
2
h) = U
I
h (27)
Ul(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) =
U Il (28)
Ub(Rb; 0) = Ub(R
2
h; C
2
h) = Ub(R
1
h; C
1
h) (29)
Uh(R
2
h; C
2
h) = Uh(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) (30)
satises all constraints but gives strictly greater prots for the uninformed lender.
For (R2l ; C
2
l ):
Constraints (3) and (8) are satised by construction.
It can be shown that (R2l ; C
2
l ) satises (5). Suppose not. Then it follows that
Ub(Rb; 0) < Ub(R
2
l ; C
2
l ). Using Remark 2, this implies Ub(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) > Ub(Rb; 0) =
Ub(R
2
h; C
2
h). That is, (1  b)(R2h  R2l ) > b(C2l   C2h). From (25),
(
1  b
b
)(R2h  R2l ) > (C2l   C2h) = (
1  h
h
)(R2h  R2l )
which is impossible. Hence (5) must hold.
For (9), the proof is by contradiction. If not true, then Ul(Rb; 0) > Ul(R2l ; C
2
l )
holds. That is lC2l > (1   l)(Rb   R2l ). Also, since (5) holds, it follows that
Ub(Rb; 0)  Ub(R2l ; C2l ). That is (1  b)(Rb  R2l )  bC2l . Combining both inequali-
70
ties,
C2l > (
1  l
l
)(Rb  R2l ) > (
1  b
b
)(Rb  R2l )  C2l
which is impossible. Hence it must be true that Ul(R2l ; C
2
l )  Ul(Rb; 0)
For (10), the proof is again by contradiction. If not true, then Ul(R2h; C
2
h) >
Ul(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) holds. That is (1  l)(R2h  R2l ) < l(C2l   C2h). Also, since (30) holds, it
follows that (1  h)(R2h  R2l ) = h(C2l   C2h). Combining both,
(C2l   C2h) > (
1  l
l
)(R2h  R2l ) > (
1  h
h
)(R2h  R2l ) = (C2l   C2h)
which is impossible. Hence it must be true that Ul(R2l ; C
2
l )  Ul(R2h; C2h).
For (R2h; C
2
h):
Constraints (2), (4) and (8) are satised by construction.
For (7), the proof is by contradiction. If not true, then Uh(Rb; 0) > Uh(R2h; C
2
h)
holds. That is hC2h > (1   h)(Rb   R2h). Also, since (29) holds, it follows that
Ub(Rb; 0) = Ub(R
2
h; C
2
h). That is (1  b)(Rb  R2h) = bC2h. Combining both inequal-
ities,
C2h > (
1  h
h
)(Rb  R2h) > (
1  b
b
)(Rb  R2h) = C2h
which is impossible. Hence it must be true that Uh(R2h; C
2
h)  Uh(Rb; 0). Using (30),
we can show that (10) holds exactly as before. Thus f(Rb; 0); (R2h; C2h); (R2l ; C2l )g
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satises all constraints. Furthermore,
h(R
2
h; C
2
h)  h(R1h; C1h)
= (1  h)(R2h  R1h) + h(C2h   C1h)
= (1  h)(R2h  R1h)  h(
1  b
b
)(R2h  R1h) [using (29)]
= [b(1  h)  h(1  b)] 1b (R2h  R1h) > 0:
Also, note that Ul(R1l ; C
1
l ) >
U Il implies that (1  l)(R¯
I
l  R1l )  lC1l . Moreover,
Ul(R
2
l ; C
2
l ) =
U Il implies (1  l)(R¯
I
l  R2l ) = lC2l . Combining the two,
(1  l)(R2l  R1l ) > l(C1l   C2l ) > l(C1l   C2l ): (31)
So l(R2l ; C
2
l )  l(R1l ; C1l )
= (1  l)(R2l  R1l ) + l(C2l   C1l )
= (1  l)(R2l  R1l )  l(C1l   C2l ) > 0. [using (31)]
Thus, the entrants maximum prots are given by
ES 1  hEh + lEl  h[(1  h)REh + hCEh   E] + l[(1  l)REl + lCEl   E]
where REl = C
E
l = 
I , and
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REh =
b
b   h
I   h
b   h [(1  b)x  U
0]
CEh =  
1  b
b   h
I +
1  h
b   h [(1  b)x  U
0].
Entrants o¤er in other candidate equilibria
From the previous section, it is easy to see that the entrants o¤er to high risks in
Screen-2 will be given by (REh ,C
E
h ). Thus, its payo¤ is
ES 2  h[(1  h)REh + hCEh   E]:
The screening cuto¤ is given by setting the above prot function to zero.
~b;hS =
b   h
b(1  h)  h(1  b)
E +
(1  )h(1  h)
b(1  h)  h(1  b) [(1  b)x  U
0].
Note that any contract that pools high risks and bad risks is dominated by (R
¯
I
h; 0).
Similarly, any contract that pools all borrowers is dominated by (R
¯
I
l ; 0). (For proofs,
see Appendix to Chapter 1). Hence, the entrants o¤ers in the candidate hybrid
equilibria follows as in Section 3.
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CHAPTER IV
CORPORATE RESPONSE TO DISTRESS: EVIDENCE FROM THE
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Introduction
In presence of nancial distress, a rm cannot typically meet its debt repayment
obligations using its liquid assets. Unless there is a sudden recovery of performance,
the distressed rm is likely to default on its debt. This could lead to a formal bank-
ruptcy ling, a dismissal of the management, and possibly, liquidation of the rm
(see, for example, Gilson, 1989). To avoid this, rms typically respond to nancial
distress by either restructuring assets (by re sales, mergers, acquisitions and capital
expenditures reductions) or liabilities (by restructuring debt both bank loans and
public debt and by injections of new capital from outside sources) or both.
Although rms face several restructuring options, most of the literature has fo-
cused on individual types of responses to distress (and their costs), primarily for
US rms.29 The only exception is a paper by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein
(1994), in which the authors provide a comprehensive analysis of several di¤erent
forms of nancial restructuring. They nd that the structure of a companys liabili-
ties is the most important determinant of the type of nancial response to distress,
while performance-related variables do not have any explanatory power. The focus
29These studies include Brown, James and Mooradians (1993) work on public debt and bank debt
restructurings; Gilson (1990) on bank debt restructurings; Brown, James and Mooradian (1994) on
asset sales; Erwin and McConnell (1997) on piecemeal voluntary liquidations; Tashjian, Lease and
McConnell (1996) on prepackaged bankruptcies; and Ang, Chua and McConnell (1982), Franks and
Torous (1989) and Hotchkiss (1994) on bankruptcy lings.
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of their paper is corporate responses under rm-specic nancial distress as opposed
to responses under economy-wide distress.
Despite the macroeconomic implications of an economy-wide nancial crisis, there
has been no comprehensive study, to the best of our knowledge, that looks into
the specic ways in which rms try to avoid liquidation during such a downturn of
economic activity, even for the US. This is an important distinction between our
paper and other related work on corporate restructurings under nancial distress.30
In particular, we focus on the ve countries  Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
South Korea and Thailand that were hit by the Asian nancial crisis of 1997-98.
Among other things, this focus allows a direct investigation of Shleifer and Vishnys
(1992) insight that, in industries facing a recession, external nancing is scarce, and
potential buyers (within the industry) cannot obtain external nance to purchase
assets from rms under distress. Restructuring through asset sales might therefore
become particularly unattractive because of large discounts on the value of the assets
being sold.31 Additionally, this study allows us to compile new evidence on the
determinants of di¤erent types of responses to an economic (rather than a rm-
specic) crisis.
A second important contribution of this study is to contrast two sets of deter-
minants of the type of nancial response: governance factors and capital struc-
ture/performance considerations. We specically investigate the role of business
30In related work that is di¤erent from ours, Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2003) analyze the
likelihood of formal (as opposed to informal) bankruptcy lings during the Asian Crisis. They nd
that bankruptcy lings are less common for bank-owned and group a¢ liated rms.
31Pulvino (1998) documents that distressed U.S. airlines sell aircrafts at a 14 percent discount
relative to their market value. This discount becomes even larger during market downturns.
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groups and family ownership, which represent the prevalent form of corporate control
outside the Anglo-Saxon systems. In the particular case of East Asia, most large rms
are closely held conglomerates structured as business groups as opposed to widely
held corporations in the US and the UK (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,
1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). Given that the control of corporate assets
were concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families (organized as groups), it
would be instructive to know as to whether group a¢ liation and ownership type had
any role to play in the resolution of nancial distress for these rms.32, 33
An important consideration in the resolution of distress is negotiations between
the distressed rm and its creditors. Banks can often be part of business groups.
Such banks are known to give preferential access to capital for rms a¢ liated to
the group, particularly for those in distress. This is partly because group-a¢ liation
lessens capital market frictions.34 This makes bank-led creditor workouts easier for
group a¢ liated rms. Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) argue that pyramid rms
can also enjoy cheaper access to capital than free-standing rms even when banks are
not part of the pyramidal group. This could be either because apex rms of the group
can serve as banks or because their superior bargaining power of such conglomerations
reduces rent-seeking by outsidebanks.
32Earlier work by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) shows that, absent nancial distress, entrenched
US managers engage in sub-optimal divestiture decisions when this allows them to pursue their
personal goals.
33Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that politically connected (typically family) rms
are especially likely to receive a bailout from their home government during the crisis.
34The literature on relationship banking documents that asymmetric information problems make
it di¢ cult for a rm to initiate a lending relationship with a bank while hold-up problems make it
di¢ cult for rms to switch banks. Such problems are mitigated if both bank and rm are part of
the same conglomeration.
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Moreover, conglomerates often provide su¢ cient cross-guarantees to bail out trou-
bled members in their group.35 Group a¢ liation therefore dilutes the information
that is available to an outsidecreditor. In a crisis situation, this opacity may help
group-a¢ liated rms as there is a greater likelihood of being bailed out by creditors.
Kim (2004) specically argues that conglomeration is a device designed by rms to
maximize the chance of bailout in the event of a default on their bank loans. His
model demonstrates that a bank has more di¢ culty inferring the quality of members
within a business group than that of stand alone rms. This is because inter-group
loan guarantees prevent the bank from knowing whether the payment is from the
borrower or from other rms in the group. Consequently, the bank is more likely
to liquidate a freestanding rm than an otherwise identical group rm. This study
provides an opportunity to nd out whether this theoretical hypothesis holds true in
practice.
With respect to capital structure considerations, it is known that debt has been
the primary source of external nance in East Asia and that some corporations were
highly leveraged. In a world where bankruptcy costs are not avoidable, characteristics
of a rms capital structure inuence the likelihood of bankruptcy as well as the
magnitude of the costs incurred (Senbet and Seward, 1995). An additional feature of
Asian economies is that rms had incentives to delay debt, operational restructuring
and even repayment of loans because of weak foreclosure and bankruptcy laws in the
35Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) record instances where controlling shareholders often
prop updistressed group rms (to the benet of public shareholders) in order to attract external
nance. While Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) view such inter-rm transfers as enhancing
economic e¢ ciency by reducing bankruptcy costs, Morck and Nakamura (1999) present evidence
showing that such transactions also include bailoutsof ine¢ cient rms.
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a¤ected countries. Bankruptcy reforms were necessary not only to ensure actual rm
failures but also for providing creditors and debtors to reach settlements out-of-court
(see Claessens et al. 2001 for details).
Our results can be summarized as follows. Examination of 651 rms from 5
Asian countries hit by the nancial crisis shows that rms predominantly respond to
the crisis by restructuring their liabilities (18.3% of rms do so). The second-most
important form of restructuring are asset sales (which are chosen by 12.3% of rms),
and then mergers (10.4% of rms). Liquidations are by far the least option, with
less of 4% of companies in the sample falling into this type of restructuring. We nd
support to the Shleifer and Vishnys (1992) asset re sale hypothesis by showing that
companys reluctance to liquidate assets relates to extremely depressed prices across
almost all industries during the crisis. In fact, asset sales that took place during the
crisis on average occurred at a 40% price discount relative to sales of similar assets
prior to the crisis.
As for the determinants of the type of response to the crisis, we nd that rms
nancial leverage is by far the most important determinant of workouts and asset
sales, followed by market-to-book ratios and rm size. On the other hand, the degree
of tangibility of assets (collateral) is important in explaining the likelihood that a rm
merges or is taken over. While nancial variables have a large impact on the type of
response, we nd that governance variables matter little if at all. In fact, even when
statistically signicant, they have marginal economic impact on the choice of nancial
response. This gives little support to the economic importance of the arguments
advanced by Kim (2004). It also indicates that when facing a major economic crisis,
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controlling families concerns with maintaining control become less important, and are
certainly dominated by the capability of rms to access additional capital.
Data sources and variables denition
Corporate response to nancial distress
To identify the resolution of nancial distress for each of the companies, we use the
Asia Pacic News Archives of the Troubled Company Reporter (TCR). The TCR is
a publicly available archive of news items on the website of the Internet Bankruptcy
Library (IBL).36 This database reports information related to nancial distress for
publicly traded companies worldwide. The database assembles information from reg-
ulatory lings, court pleadings, judicial rulings and press reports. The searches are
run for each company over the period February 1, 1998 (the date TCR starts covering
distress) to December 31, 2000. The responses are classied under the following four
(nancial) alternatives available to corporate managers for dealing with distress: (1)
debt restructurings, (2) asset sales, (3) mergers and (4) liquidations.
We dene debt restructuring (also referred to as a workout) as an agreement
by the rmscreditors to modify any terms of an outstanding nancial claim cur-
rently held against the rm. This term includes both public and private loan agree-
ments. Common restructuring methods include exchange o¤ers (debt for equity),
covenant modication and maturity extension or interest rate adjustments. The
workout variable also includes injections of capital by creditors.37 In fact, often, debt-
36http://www.bankrupt.com/TCRAP_Public/index.html
37Some authors, like Senbet and Seward (1995), have treated capital injections by creditors as a
separate category.
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restructurings were packaged to include a combination of rescheduling, debt-equity
swaps and capital injections by creditors.
Asset sales are used frequently by rms to resolve nancial distress. Brown et
al. (1994) point out that asset sales for distressed rms occur primarily under the
pressure of creditors, often to the detriment of stockholders.38 In particular, they
argue that the probability that an asset sale is used to repay debt increases with
the rms debt (leverage) and decreases with the rms nancial condition (operating
performance).
Brown et al. (1994) also nd that the distinguishing characteristics of rms which
sell assets are that they operate multiple divisions and subsidiaries. As a result,
diversied groups might be more likely to sell assets than free-standing rms. More-
over, managers that respond favorably to creditor pressure to undertake asset sales
are more likely to retain control of the rm. This seems to suggest that rms, in
which owners have greater control rights at stake, are more likely to undertake asset
sales to retain control. Finally, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), illiquid asset
markets may lead distressed rms to sell assets at signicant discounts from their
current value use. This consideration is particularly important for asset sales during
an economy-wide crisis.
Our measure of asset sales comes from two sources: (1) items in the Troubled
Company Reporter, and (2) data from SDC PlatinumTM (which reports information
on the divestitures of subsidiaries). To check the robustness of our results, we use
38Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), however, nd that asset sales used to retire debt result in a
higher average (positive) abnormal stock return than when sales proceeds are retained by the rm.
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a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is drop in the book value of
property, plant and equipment (gross of accumulated depreciation and amortization)
that exceeds 15% of the book value of total assets in any given year and zero otherwise.
This dummy variable is generated using data from the Worldscope database for the
period 1997-2000.
Next, we collect data on mergers and acquisitions. We start by collecting data
with searches in the Troubled Company Reporter and then integrate this data with
information from SDC PlatinumTM, Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database,
and nally, keyword searches in Factiva. Lastly, the TCR archive was searched for
liquidations of companies. This information was also integrated with keyword searches
in Factiva. Examples of articles for each type of response to nancial distress from
the TCR archive (IBL web site) are reported in the Appendix.
Governance variables
To capture the inuence of the largest shareholder, we control for the ultimate
voting stake held by this agent. In general, shareholders who extract substantial con-
trol benets have little incentive to undertake any form of restructuring that involves
a sale of assets (especially those in its extreme form, such as liquidations) because
this reduces their private benets of control. Instead, these shareholders prefer debt
workouts because this form of restructuring is unlikely to dilute their control. To
control for this e¤ect, we include the variable Largest block-holder concentration (also
referred to as Control), which comes from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), and
captures the e¤ects of complex control structures. For example, if a family owns 50%
81
of Firm X that owns 30% of Firm Y, then this family is assumed to control 30% of
Firm Y (the weakest link in the chain of control).
The same authors have assembled a number of data sources to identify whether
a company is part of a major business Group. We use their business group variable
to study the impact of conglomeration on the type of response to corporate distress.
As mentioned before, Kim (2004) predicts a higher likelihood of a debt workout for
a group a¢ liated rm.
Earlier work by Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) has shown that many
Asian rms were owned by key politicians (or by people close to them) and frequently
received government aid during the crisis. Therefore, we control for whether a given
company has outstanding political ties. As in their paper, a company is dened as
Politically connected if at least one of its top directors (CEO, president, vice-president,
or secretary) or large shareholders (any blockholder controlling at least 10% of votes)
is a member of parliament, or a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or
party. If these companies receive indirect aid from the government, we would not only
expect a higher incidence of workouts, but also more frequent sales of assets (where
buyers are pressured to purchase by government o¢ cials). At the very least, these
rms are less likely to be liquidated in the event of distress since this would result in
a loss of benets for the politician.
We rene some of these variables further to distinguish between the types of con-
trolling shareholders (e.g., families or governments) as well as to determine whether
a company is part of a group that includes a bank. The latter would increase the
likelihood of a workout because the company can presumably inuence the banks
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lending choices.
We control for a¢ liation to a group that includes at least one bank by using
the indicator variable Bank in Group. Information on the members of each business
group is compiled based on data from Claessens et al.s (2000). We also include
two ownership indicators. The variable Family takes the value of one if the rm
is privately held or if the largest shareholder of the company under consideration
is a family and zero otherwise. Likewise, Government denotes instances in which
the largest shareholder is a national government, a local authority, or a government
agency.
Financial determinants of the response to distress
In the rest of this section we will dene the nancial variables employed in the
analysis. Unless stated di¤erently, our main data source is the 1997 company nancial
reports of the Worldscope database.
Firstly, Brown et al. (1994) show that the most important predictors of bank-
ruptcy lings are performance and leverage. As proxy for the companys accounting
performance, we employ the standard nancial ratios like theReturn on Equity (ROE)
and the turnover of assets (ratio of Sales/Total assets). For robustness purposes, we
also use the Return on Assets (ROA) and the Industry Adjusted EBITDA/Assets
ratio. The latter is dened as the ratio of the companys earnings before interest
expense, income taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), to the book value
of its total assets. The ratio is netted out of its industry median (across all countries),
where a rms industry is given by its primary two-digit SIC code.
83
In addition, Asquith et al. (1994) also point out that a rms capital structure
is an important determinant of the type of nancial response. For this reason, we
include two proxies to capture high leverage. Leverage is the ratio of total debt
to the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. The other proxy for
leverage (and related nancial distress) is [(Interest Expense EBITDA)/ Interest
Expense] ; computed as the ratio of the di¤erence between interest expense on debt
and EBITDA over the interest expense on debt. Interest expense on debt represents
the service charge for the use of capital. EBITDA is dened as above.
We control for market expectations of recovery through the variable Mkt. Value/
Book Ratio (MB), computed as the ratio of the market value of equity (ordinary and
preferred) plus book value of total debt over the book value of total assets. The
latter is dened as the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment
in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment,
and other assets.
Furthermore, the choice for a workout is likely to depend on company size and
borrowing capability. In view of this, we also include the variables Log(mkcapUS$),
the log of the companys equity market capitalization as of December 31, 1997 mea-
sured in thousands of US$ and Collateral, calculated as the ratio of property, plant
and equipment to total assets.
Finally, following Asquith et al. (1994), we initially test for the Shleifer and
Vishnys (1992) idea that market for assets may be illiquid because potential industry
buyers (who value assets most) are also distressed by adding the Industry Median
Leverage and the Industry Median MB Ratio to our list of regressors. There variables
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are the median ratios of the Leverage and MB variables (dened above) computed
for rms (across all countries) in the same (two digit SIC) industry.
Summary Statistics
The countries included in this paper are the ve countries that were worst a¤ected
by the Asian Crisis of 1997-98. Firms in these countries were selected on the basis of
three criteria. First, each rm must have nancial data reported in the Worldscope
database which is the primary source for accounting data. Second, each rm must be
included in the ownership dataset complied by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002).
Third, the primary business segment of each rm must not be in nancial services,
that is, not in the standard industrial classication (SIC) 6000-6999. The sample
selection process is outlined in Panel A of Table 3. The nal sample consists of 651
rms. In general, the sample is representative of larger rms that trade on the major
stock exchanges in each country. As mentioned earlier, we identify the responses to
the Asian nancial crisis for each of these rms. The details of the responses and
their distribution by country are provided in Table 3 and 4.
Several important trends are visible in the data. First, workouts seem to be the
most preferred response to distress in East Asia. This gives some preliminary support
to the arguments by Shleifer and Vishny (1992): given the large discounts that may
need to be applied, forms of restructuring involving the sale of assets might become
particularly unattractive. Such discounts clearly are not present when liabilities are
being restructured.39 Interestingly, many rms simply chose to do nothing: a natural
39On the contrary, restructurings often occurred with reducing the rates on the loans and even at
times (rarely) with the creditor forgiving some part of the principal repayment due.
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response when creditors dont approve the restructuring of the rms liabilities, and
the discounts applied to asset re sales are perceived to be too large.
When forms of restructuring involving the sale of assets (e.g., asset sales, mergers
and liquidation) are considered together, they nonetheless add up to a considerable
number of cases. However, we need to point out that di¤erent forms of asset sales
cannot really be pooled together. For example, asset sales (as well as mergers) and
liquidations are very di¤erent from a managerial perspective. Empirical studies for the
US have shown that managers often sell assets to avoid bankruptcy since in Chapter
11 managerial turnover is high (Gilson, 1989; Hotchkiss 1994) and compensation is
reduced (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). Moreover, Brown, James and Mooradian
(1994) show that managers are less likely to lose their jobs if they repay debt with
proceeds from asset sales, since asset sales also reduce the probability of bankruptcy.40
Third, when compared to the other types of responses to the crisis, our sample
records a small number of liquidations for the period 1998-2000. This supports the
conjecture in White (2001) that bankruptcy procedures in countries a¤ected by a
systemic crisis are likely to result in very little liquidation. However, this could also
be the case because, as mentioned earlier, our sample includes larger rms as opposed
to smaller rms that face a higher probability of liquidation.
Panel B compares nancial data by rmsresponse to the distress. Larger rms
(size measured here by the mean of total assets) tend to restructure, while smaller
rms are more likely not to undertake any visible form of restructuring. There is little
40It needs to be mentioned here that large East Asian rms are typically closely held, where the
manager is often the largest shareholder. Therefore, it might be di¢ cult to attribute some of the
incentives that motivate US managers to operate for those in East Asian rms.
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di¤erence between rms that undertake mergers or asset sales in terms of our summary
statistics, except for the fact that rms that undergo mergers are on average smaller
than those that resort to asset sales. On the other hand, the Panel B shows that rms
that are liquidated have by far the worst net performance, with an average of ROE of
-73.35%. The second worse performance is found for companies that restructure their
liabilities through a workout. Firms that dont restructure, on the other hand, tend to
do relatively better: they are in fact the group with the highest average (and median)
ROE and ROA. This result contrasts with Asquith et al. (1994) who, in the US, nd
no evidence that rm with better operating performance deal more successfully with
nancial distress. Panel B also shows that companies under liquidation, or workout
are very highly leveraged (the average Leverage is 85% for the workout group and 90%
for the liquidations). Firms undertaking asset sales or mergers have lower, although
still high, leverage. Once again, rms that do not restructure have relatively better
nancial conditions, with a leverage of only61%. Firms that dont restructure also
seem to have better MB ratios (at least when we look at average values).
An interesting observation here is that Panel B points to a di¤erent characteristic
between the two responses: Among rms that have successfully dealt with nancial
distress, a larger fraction of them are a¢ liated to a business group. Furthermore, the
voting stake held by the largest block-holder is signicantly higher for rms under-
going a successful response to their distress than those being forced to liquidate. In
summary, rms that were successful in restructuring their debt or received injections
of capital from outside are more likely to have better nancial performance, be larger
in size, a¢ liated to a group and closely held.
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Regression results
In our regression analysis, we adopt two approaches to estimate for the deter-
minants of responses. The rst approach assumes that the responses of individual
rms are independent, while the second relaxes this assumption. Note that, since
multiple responses are possible for a single rm, we estimate a multivariate probit
model in the second approach. This involves a general system of four equations (one
for each response) with correlated disturbances, wherein the error terms are assumed
to follow a multivariate normal distribution. We show below that even when we relax
the assumptions of independent responses, the results are similar to that in the rst
approach. Therefore, in our case, using independent (univariate) probit equations for
each response is not a restrictive assumption.
Independent Probit Regressions
We will use probit equations to estimate the determinants of rm responses to
nancial distress. The results of probit equations under di¤erent specications are
reported in Tables 6-9. Before discussing the results it is important to point out that
each specication includes three types of covariates, namely (i) nancial variables, (ii)
group a¢ liation data and (iii) industry performance variables. For operating perfor-
mance, we use Return on Equity in specications (1), (3) and (5), while Sales/TA is
used in specications (2), (4) and (6). For group a¢ liation data, specications (1)-(2)
use the Group dummy variable, specications (3)-(4) use Largest Block-holder Con-
centration (or Control) and specications (5)-(6) use other group a¢ liation variables
like Bank in Group, Family and Government. For Tables 6-9, we report marginal
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e¤ects computed at the means of the independent variables.
We nd that four explanatory variables are signicantly related to the probabil-
ity of a workout: Leverage, Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio, Log(mkcapUS$), and Control.
Leverage is clearly the variable with the largest economic impact: one standard de-
viation increase in the rms leverage ratio increases the likelihood of a workout by
0.54. The second most important variable is the Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio: One stan-
dard deviation increase in this variable reduces the likelihood of a workout by 0.19.
The results also show that one standard deviation increase in size (Log(mkcapUS$))
increases the probability of restructuring through a workout by 0.09. Thus, compa-
nies that chose to restructure their liabilities are predominantly large rms with high
leverage and poor growth prospects (as measured by the MB ratio). These results
are consistent with the univariate evidence discussed earlier. However, the results
strongly contrast with the evidence in Asquith et al. (1994) who only nd the lever-
age ratio to be signicant in their models. The variable Control, although statistically
signicant, has a marginal economic impact on the likelihood of a workout. In par-
ticular, one standard deviation increase in the percentage of control rights enjoyed
by the largest shareholder increases the likelihood of a workout by 0.001. Finally, we
nd no statistical signicance for Collateral, Return on Equity, industry variables and
other group-a¢ liation variables. Their economic impact is found to be small as well.
Importantly, the results on the Group and Family dummies provide little support for
Kims (2004) arguments.
The variables that signicantly explain the choice of selling assets (Table 7) are
the same variables that were found to be signicant in the case of debt-workouts
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(Table 6). As in the previous regression, the control variable, although statistically
signicant (this time with a negative sign), has a small impact on the likelihood of an
asset sale. Leverage is once again the variable with the largest economic impact on
the restructuring choice. In particular, we nd that one standard deviation increase
in leverage increases the likelihood of an asset sale by 0.37. Furthermore, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the MB ratio decreases the likelihood of an asset sale
by 0.15, while one standard deviation increase in size (as measured by Log(mkcapUS$)
increases the likelihood of an asset sale by 0.13. Finally, rms owned by the gov-
ernment are likely to engage in asset sales. Government ownership increases the
likelihood of asset sales by 0.09.
We then analyze the determinants of the decision to merge (or being taken over).
Three variables explain this choice: Leverage, Collateral and Control. Collateral
is positively and signicantly related to the likelihood of a merger. One standard
deviation increase in this variable results in an increase in the likelihood of a merger
by 0.17. This result is in line with earlier evidence by Ambrose and Megginson (1992).
The positive relationship may be explained by the fact that bidders like safe assets.
Additionally, since rms with high collateral have higher debt capacity, they can be
considered ideal target for high-leveraged transactions (HLTs). Once again, Leverage
is positively and signicantly associated with the probability of restructuring this
time through a merger, although the impact of this variable is no longer as strongly
statistically signicant as for the previous two responses. One standard deviation
increase in leverage increases the likelihood of a merger by 0.14. Notice that this
result contrasts with most of the previous literature aimed at predicting takeover
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targets (e.g., Palepu, 1986, Song and Walkling, 1993, Comment and Schwert, 1995,
and Pinkowitz, 2002), which nds leverage to be insignicantly or negatively related
to the likelihood of becoming a takeover target. The di¤erence is however easily
explained in this context: most highly leveraged rms in our sample are nancially
distressed, and therefore actively seek for some form of restructuring. Finally, we
nd a small but signicant e¤ect of control rights concentration on the likelihood of a
merger: In particular, one standard deviation increase in the level of concentration of
control results in a reduction of the likelihood of becoming a takeover target by 0.002.
This result, too, is easily explained. If, as documented in Nenova (2003) and Dyck and
Zingales (2004), control is valuable, a dominant shareholder may be reluctant to sell
her stake since this would result in the loss of sizeable private benets; the preference
for other restructuring choices (or no restructuring at all) is then inevitable.
Finally, we examine the determinants of the choice of liquidation. Firms that
opt for liquidation are small in size, highly leveraged, have more dispersed ownership
and are less likely to have political connections. One standard deviation increase in
leverage increases the likelihood of liquidation by anything from 0.02 to 0.06. Finally
variables like Control and Politically Connected have a small, yet signicant impact
on the likelihood of liquidation. Not surprisingly, closely-held rms and those with
political connections are less likely to be liquidated.
It is worthwhile to point out that the signs on the marginal e¤ects for Leverage
and MB ratio are the same in all of the four responses and across all specications
(for each response). This underlines the fact that highly leveraged rms with poor
growth opportunities rms are simply more likely to react to the economic crisis
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through restructuring or face liquidation.
Multivariate Probit Regressions
An alternative way to estimate the model is to relax the assumption of independent
responses. Consequently, the model can be estimated by a multivariate probit model.
This requires four probit equations (one for each response) with correlated distur-
bances, similar in spirit to seemingly unrelated regression models. The specication
for the four-equation model is
yij = xij + "ij, i = 1; 2; :::; n; j = 1; 2; 3; 4. (32)
where yij = 1, if yij > 0, 0 otherwise
The error terms, "ij, are distributed as a multivariate normal, with a mean of zero,
and a variance-covariance matrix V , in which cov["ij; "ik] = jk = kj and kk = 1.
41
The dependent variables in the model are
yi1 = response is a debt workout
yi2 = response is an asset sale
yi3 = response is a merger
yi4 = response is liquidation
Under the null that jk = 0 (for all j 6= k), the model consists of independent
41The practical di¢ culty to estimating (32) lies in evaluating higher-order mulitvariate normal
integrals. The multidimensional normal integrals in the likelihood function are estimated using the
GHK smooth recursive simulator described in Greene (2003, pp. 714-719).
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probit equations which could be estimated separately. This assumption was implicitly
made by Asquith et al. (1994).
The estimated coe¢ cients of the multivariate model are reported in Panel A of
Table 7. Panel B of Table 7 reports the correlation structure of the error terms.
Generally, the correlation coe¢ cients are small. Note that the correlation coe¢ cient
between the error term in the rst equation and the error term in the second equation
(i.e., 12) and the correlation coe¢ cient between the error term in the second and the
error term in the fourth equation (i.e., 24) are statistically signicant. However,
the other four correlation coe¢ cients are not signicant at standard levels. We then
further investigate the lack of independence by computing the likelihood ratio of test
for the null hypothesis 12 = 13 = 13 = 23 = 24 = 34 = 0. The likelihood
ratio test does not allow rejecting the null of zero correlation (2(6) = 8:31 and p  
value = 0:22). Thus, it seems that estimating independent probit regressions is not
too restrictive an assumption.
We also report the coe¢ cients for similar tests of the independent probit regres-
sions in Table 11 (Note that Tables 6-9 report marginal e¤ects). A quick comparison
between the coe¢ cients reported in Table 11 with those in Table 10, reveals a small
di¤erence between the two sets. The statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients is sim-
ilar between the two estimations procedures.
Testing the "re" sales hypothesis
Earlier work by Asquith et al. (1994) found that distressed companies are less
likely to sell assets if they operate in highly leveraged industries, and more likely to
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sell assets if they operate in industries with higher growth perspectives. However, all
companies are likely to face liquidity problems to some degree during an economy-wide
crisis. This makes it di¢ cult to nd evidence in support of the above phenomenon if
we limit our analysis to data during the crisis.
An alternative test of the re-sale hypothesis would be to compare prices on asset
sales before the onset of the crisis (which we will refer to as the pre-crisisperiod)
to asset sales during, and in the aftermath of the crisis (also referred to as the post-
crisisperiod). We compare the price-to-sales multiples paid for the acquisition of
companies in a given (2-digit SIC) industry for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.
We rely on the price to sales multiples for two reasons. First, multiples based on
EBIT or accounting prots are rendered meaningless because most companies had
negative protability during the crisis. Second, data on price-to-sales multiples is
more readily available in SDC PlatinumTM than other accounting items such as book
value of equity. This is important because a larger sample size helps in reducing the
impact of outliers in the data.
We rst compute the ratio of the price paid for control transactions divided by the
book value of sales for the given target. Control transactions include M&As, leveraged
buyouts, inter-corporate tender o¤ers, spin-o¤s, purchases of minority stakes (i.e.,
toehold acquisitions), of remaining interests, and recapitalizations. This is done for
all recorded transactions in SDC PlatinumTM between January 1, 1995 and December
31, 2000. To be included in our sample, the targets of these transactions must be
headquartered in one of the ve countries in our analysis. However, we do not impose
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any restriction on the country of the buyer.42
We then average the price-to-sales multiples across rms in each (2-digit SIC)
industry, separately for the pre-crisis (1995-1997) and post-crisis (1998-2000)
periods. Due to lack of observations (or possibly, a lack of transactions in the period of
crisis) a comparison between data for the two periods is possible for only 30 industries
(as before, we exclude the nancial sector). The results are summarized in Table 12.
In support of the re-sale hypothesis we nd that, for 23 out of 30 industries, the
average multiple was lower in the post-crisis when compared to the pre-crisis period.
More specically, prior to the crisis, the average price to sales multiple (across all
industries) was 4.18, while in the aftermath of the crisis this ratio dropped to 2.48. The
di¤erence between the two is statistically signicant (paired t test p-value = 0.002). A
comparison of the pre- and post-crisis periods indicates that prices dropped by 40.6%
during the crisis, which suggests substantially large discounts. These discounts are
more pronounced than those documented earlier by Pulvino (1998), who records an
average discount of 14% for the sale of aircrafts by distressed airlines in the U.S., which
further increased to 30% during market recessions. Larger discounts documented here
can be explained when one considers two factors. First, as mentioned earlier, it is more
di¢ cult for corporations to sell assets during an economy-wide crisis because rms
across all industries as opposed to rms within the specic industry face liquidity
problems. Second, these liquidity problems are more acute in emerging markets than
in developed economies like the US. Clearly, these large discounts could explain why
42It is worthwhile to point out that for 81% of the deals in the pre-crisis period, both target and
bidder were from the same country. However, this proportion drops to 65% during the crisis. This is
suggestive of the fact that fewer companies in countries a¤ected by the crisis could bid successfully
for the target.
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the restructuring of liabilities in our sample is more common than the sale of assets.
Robustness tests
Media Bias
Any study, for which empirical data has been collected from media reports, is
bound to have a bias, and ours is no exception. For example, a large number of
rms have been categorized under the do nothinggroup. Indeed, one could argue
that such rms probably undertook some form of nancial restructuring, but these
were not captured in the news items of the IBL database. However, it is worthwhile
to mention that rms classied under the do nothinggroup have better operating
performance (e.g., higher MB ratios) and lower leverage than those belonging to any
of the other groups. Clearly, such rms are more likely to do nothingwhen it comes
to responding to the crisis.
Distressed rms only
Following Asquith et al. (1994), we conduct probit regressions over a sample of
rms which are dened to be distressed under some nancial criterion. A rm is
dened to be nancially distressed if during 1997-2000, the company had (any) two
consecutive years with earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) less than its reported interest expense or, in any one year, EBITDA was
less than 80% of the rms interest expense. This reduces the number of rms in the
sample from 651 to 315.
The results of independent probit regressions on the (smaller) sample of distressed
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rms are presented in Tables 13-16. The results conrm our ndings from the full
sample: the likelihood of undertaking an asset sale or a debt workout the predom-
inant forms of restructuring increases with the leverage and size of the rm but
decreases with better growth perspectives (as measured by the MB ratio). Moreover,
just as in the full sample regression, Collateral is positively and signicantly related
to the likelihood of a merger. Again, we nd a small but signicant negative e¤ect
of control rights concentration on the likelihood of any asset-side restructuring (like
a merger or an asset sale).
However, there are two notable exceptions when one includes distressed rms only.
First, industry level variables now have a strong and signicant impact on the likeli-
hood of any asset-side restructuring. Both Industry Median MB Ratio and Leverage
record positive and signicant e¤ects on the likelihood that a distressed rm under-
takes an assets sale or a merger. Finally, some ownership variables are also signicant
for distressed rm restructurings, but their impact is small. In particular, Family
ownership decreases the likelihood of asset sales, Banks in Group increases the likeli-
hood of mergers and Government ownership increases the likelihood of liquidations.
Other measures of asset sales
As mentioned earlier, we check the robustness of our results on determinants of
asset sales using a dummy variable of PPE reduction for drops in the book value of
property, plant and equipment exceeding 15% of the book value of total assets in any
given year. The results are presented in Table 17. As before, highly-leveraged rms
are more likely to record drops in PPE, but now even the industry-wide leverage
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has a positive and signicant impact on the likelihood of asset-side restructurings.
Note that the sign on the variable contradicts the hypothesis that industry leverage
adversely inuences the likelihood of asset sales. A possible explanation here could
be the distinction between an industry-wide recession and an economy-wide crisis.
As a result of a crisis, rms selling assets under pressure from creditors may be forced
to sell to buyers from a di¤erent industry, or even (as documented earlier) to buyers
in a di¤erent country. Thus, the likelihood of an asset sale increases with increase
in the industry median leverage as creditors force companies to sell assets, to any
buyer, even from outside the industry. Here too, the ownership variables have a small
impact on asset sales.
Other measures of operating performance
As mentioned before, we conduct robustness checks on the determinants of a rms
choice of response by adopting di¤erent measures of operating performance. We
conduct independent probit regressions by using two alternative measures, namely
Return on Assets (the results of which are given in Table 18) and Industry Adjusted
EBITDA/TA (the results of which are given in Table 19). Again results conrm our
ndings from the full sample (we conduct regressions on specication (1) in Tables
6-9). A rms nancial condition is an important determinant of its restructuring
choice while other ownership variables are marginally signicant at best.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the determinants of the choice of corporate restructuring
during an economy-wide crisis. Evidently, nancial variables have a large impact
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on the type of response, but we nd that governance variables are only marginally
signicant at best. In particular, we nd that companies which chose to restructure
by asset sales and debt workouts are predominantly large rms with high leverage
and poor growth prospects (as measured by the MB ratio). Companies with higher
debt capacity (as measured by Collateral) are more likely targets of mergers. As for
governance variables, we nd, for example, that political connections can reduce the
likelihood that a rm is liquidated. However, the impact of such variables is extremely
small.
Another important nding of this study points to a preference of rms to undertake
a restructuring of its liabilities as opposed to its assets during an economy-wide crisis.
This is in line with previous theoretical hypothesis in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that
given a general downturn in the industry (in our case, the economy), asset sales might
therefore become particularly unattractive because prospective buyers of such assets
are themselves liquidity-constrained. This study documents evidence in support of
the re-salehypothesis that, during the Asian crises, assets sales were usually at
large discounts (40% price discount on average)
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Table 3—Summary statistics: Panel A reports the summary statistics for 651 firms in five countries affected by the East Asian crisis. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the 
financial variables by the choice of firm response to the crisis. Summary statistics are means excepted where denoted. Financial statement data comes from Worldscope and is based 
on the latest financial statements prior to December 1997. The data for responses under distress have been collected publicly available archive of news items on the website of the 
Internet Bankruptcy Library (IBL), SCD and Factiva (see text for details). Workout is an agreement by the firms’ creditors to modify any terms of an outstanding financial claim 
currently held against the firm (for both public and private loan agreements). Asset Sale includes news items that record both sales of assets and divestitures in subsidiaries or 
divisions in order to retire debt. Merger is an indicator that denotes whether a given company merged or was taken over during 1998-2000. Liquidation is an indicator that denotes 
whether a given company was liquidated during 1998-2000. Do nothing indicate firms that did not undertake any visible form of financial restructuring during the period analyzed. 
Mkt. capitalization ($, million) is the company’s equity market capitalization as of December 31, 1997 measured in millions of US$. Total assets ($, million) is the book value of the 
sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment, and other assets. Mkt. value/ book 
ratio is the ratio of the market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of total debt over the book value of total assets. The latter is defined as the sum of total 
current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment, and other assets. Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by 
year-end total assets (%). Return on Equity (ROE) is calculated as net income available to shareholders divided by year-end book value of shareholder equity (%). Largest block-
holder concentration is defined as the percentage holdings of the largest shareholder. Group-affiliation is a dummy variable that indicates whether the company is part of a major 
business group. This variable comes from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). 
Panel A: Comparison by country 
      All countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
       
Sample inclusion criteria       
      
      
      
      
      
Number of firms in Worldscope 1,305 154 445 114 313 279
Number of firms passing Claessens et al (2002) screen 869 137 215 110 274 133
Number of firms after the elimination of financial 
companies 651 104 159 70 225 93
 
Response under distress 
Workout 119      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
20 17 10 43 29
Asset sale 80 3 26 8 34 9
Merger 68 4 15 12 32 5
Liquidation 26 2 0 0 23 1
 
Financial Statistics 
Mkt. capitalization ($, million) 258.36 286.08 507.62 231.46 135.06 119.72
Total assets ($, million) 853.72 497.21 718.88 422.05 1,425.33 424.87
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio (mean) 1.19 1.08 1.51 0.97 1.11 1.10
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio (median) 1.02 0.89 1.05 0.82 1.07 0.97
Leverage 0.68 0.66 0.56 0.47 0.82 0.73
Return on assets 0.71 1.46 4.64 3.59 1.49 -10.88
Return on equity -16.05 -9.43 0.37 2.61 -24.61 -44.89
 
Ownership Structure 
Group affiliation (percentage) 59.45 69.23 59.12 74.29 54.22 50.54
Largest block-holder concentration 26.09 34.76 28.36 24.21 17.77 34.02
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Panel B: Comparison by response type 
Response 
No. of 
firms 
Total 
Assets 
Mkt. Value/ Book 
Ratio Leverage Return on assets Return on equity 
Largest block-holder 
concentration 
Group 
affiliation 
              Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Percentage
Workout              119 1,535.71 1.11 1.02 0.85 0.84 -6.02 -0.37 -42.85 -15.25 25.16 29.85 67.23
Asset sale              80 2,708.42 1.07 1.07 0.78 0.82 -0.44 3.41 -14.82 -1.55 20.92 20.00 66.25
Merger            68 1,182.50 1.11 1.06 0.77 0.83 -0.39 2.08 -19.68 -7.96 22.42 20.00 64.70
Liquidation              26 1,864.42 1.07 1.03 0.90 0.94 -1.14 0.18 -73.35 -41.68 15.57 10.00 50.00
Do nothing              423 474.15 1.24 1.00 0.61 0.61 2.74 4.31 -6.87 4.07 27.50 30.00 57.21
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Table 4—Classification of responses by firms. The responses are recorded under the following four (financial) alternatives available to corporate managers for 
dealing with distress: (1) financial (or debt) restructurings, (2) asset sales, (3) mergers and (4) liquidations. Workout is an agreement by the firms’ creditors to 
modify any terms of an outstanding financial claim currently held against the firm (for both public and private loan agreements). Asset Sale includes news items 
that record both sales of assets and divestitures in subsidiaries or divisions in order to retire debt. Merger is an indicator that denotes whether a given company 
merged or was taken over during 1998-2000. Liquidation is an indicator that denotes whether a given company was liquidated during 1998-2000. The data 
sources for all variables are given in the text. In Panel A, the diagonal numbers denote single responses by firms, while off-diagonal numbers denote two 
responses by firms. Panel B lists the distribution of responses for firms that record three responses. No firm in our sample has recorded four responses. 
 
 
 
Panel A: One or two responses by firms 
     Workout Asset sale Merger Liquidation
Workout   74    
Asset sale  23    
    
    
    
40
Merger 13 12 36
Liquidation 2 0 1 20
Total 119 80 68 26
 
Panel B: Three responses by firms  
   Response      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Total
Workout           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Asset sale          
         
         
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5
Merger 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6
Liquidation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
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Table 5—Pair-wise correlations for exogenous variables. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. 
[(Interest Expense – EBITDA)/ Interest Expense] is computed as the ratio of the difference between interest expense on debt and EBITDA over the interest 
expense on debt. Interest expense on debt represents the service charge for the use of capital. EBITDA is defined as earnings of a company before interest 
expense, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. Mkt. value/ book ratio is the ratio of the market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of 
total debt over the book value of total assets. The latter is defined as the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment, and other assets. Collateral is calculated as the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. Log (mkcapUS$) is the log of the company’s equity market capitalization as of December 31, 1997 measured in thousands of US$. Return on Equity 
(ROE) is calculated as net income available to shareholders divided by year-end book value of shareholder equity (%). Sales/TA, also the asset-turnover ratio, is 
measured as the total sales divided by total assets. Group is a dummy variable that indicates whether the company is part of a major business group. This variable 
comes from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). Largest block-holder concentration is defined as the percentage holdings of the largest shareholder. Industry 
Median MB Ratio and Industry Median Leverage are industry-level financial variables where a firm’s industry is defined based on its primary two-digit SIC code 
(across countries). Political connection is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the company’s top directors (CEO, president, vice-
president, or secretary) or large shareholders (any blockholder controlling at least 10% of votes) is a member of parliament, or a minister, or is closely related to a 
top politician or party, and 0 otherwise. 
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   Leverage 
[(Int. Expense – 
EBITDA)/ Int. 
Expense] 
Mkt. Value/ 
Book Ratio Collateral 
Log (Mkt. 
Cap) 
(US$) 
Return 
on 
Equity 
Sales/ 
TA Group
Largest 
block-holder 
concen. 
Industry 
Median 
MB Ratio 
Industry 
Median 
Leverage 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA)/ Int. 
Expense] 0.029           
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio 0.124           
           
           
          
         
          
           
          
         
         
-0.161
Collateral -0.044 -0.060 -0.079
Log (Mkt. Cap) in USD -0.178 -0.063 0.339 0.127
Return on Equity -0.506 -0.047 0.006 -0.041 0.219
Sales/TA 0.073 -0.073 0.141 -0.231 -0.037 0.050
Group -0.006 0.021 -0.018 -0.071 0.119 0.058 0.025
Largest block-holder 
concentration -0.131 -0.028 0.104 0.072 0.121 0.027 0.069 0.071
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.014 -0.082 0.364 -0.105 0.238 0.072 0.116 0.081 0.108
Industry Median Leverage 0.284 -0.117 -0.102 -0.130 -0.116 -0.077 0.149 -0.001 -0.065 -0.058
Politically connected -0.018 -0.020 0.103 -0.076 0.207 0.033 -0.073 0.127 0.080 0.126 -0.086
 
 
 Table 6—Determinants of Workouts:  Results of independent probit regressions used to predict firm debt workouts. 
Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company undertook a debt workout during 1998-2000, and zero 
otherwise. Workout is an agreement by the firms’ creditors to modify any terms of an outstanding financial claim 
currently held against the firm (for both public and private loan agreements). Family takes the value of one if the 
largest shareholder of the company under consideration is a family or a privately held firm. Government denotes 
instances in which the largest shareholder is a national government, a local authority, or a government agency. Bank 
in Group takes the value of one if the group includes at least one bank. The definitions of the other regressors are the 
same as in Tables 5. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below 
the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.538*** 0.445*** 0.562*** 0.456*** 0.534*** 0.442*** 
 (0.056) (0.128) (0.059) (0.145) (0.046) (0.121) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.0000236 -0.000036 -0.0000219 -0.0000349 -0.0000229 -0.0000357 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.185*** -0.142*** -0.195*** -0.149*** -0.186*** -0.144*** 
 (0.023) (0.049) (0.024) (0.055) (0.024) (0.047) 
Collateral 0.007 -0.034 -0.011 -0.053 -0.000451 -0.047 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.082) (0.085) (0.092) (0.095) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.090*** 0.078* 0.096*** 0.083* 0.094*** 0.083* 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.046) 
Return on Equity -0.0000796  -0.0000359  -0.0000667  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.116**  -0.114**  -0.115** 
  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.057) 
Group 0.039 0.045     
 (0.032) (0.036)     
Largest block-holder  
concentration   0.001** 0.001   
   (0.001) (0.001)   
Bank in Group     -0.021 -0.013 
     (0.055) (0.057) 
Family     0.007 0.004 
     (0.036) (0.034) 
Government      -0.002 -0.016 
     (0.054) (0.048) 
Politically connected  0.061 0.036 0.061 0.039 0.066 0.042 
 (0.066) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.059) (0.052) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.139 -0.108 -0.121 -0.093 -0.131 -0.098 
 (0.103) (0.081) (0.105) (0.080) (0.111) (0.085) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.142* -0.028 -0.143* -0.024 -0.136 -0.022 
 (0.086) (0.131) (0.080) (0.126) (0.086) (0.122) 
Observations 549 560 549 560 549 560 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
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 Table 7—Determinants of Asset Sales:  Results of independent probit regressions used to predict firm asset sales. 
Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company undertook an asset sale during 1998-2000, and zero 
otherwise. Asset Sale includes news items that record both sales of assets and divestitures in subsidiaries or 
divisions in order to retire debt. Data on asset sales comes from two sources: (1) we look at whether any information 
concerning sales of assets was reported in the Troubled Company Reporter, and (2) we integrate this data with the 
information contained in SDC PlatinumTM, which reports information on the divestitures of subsidiaries. The 
definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level 
clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.374*** 0.300*** 0.319*** 0.262*** 0.374*** 0.302*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.046) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000004 -0.000004 0.000001 -0.000003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.156*** -0.168*** -0.143*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.167*** 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) 
Collateral -0.086 -0.080 -0.068 -0.058 -0.068 -0.066 
 (0.053) (0.059) (0.048) (0.059) (0.052) (0.055) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) 
Return on Equity 0.0002908  0.0001989  0.0002747*  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  0.009  0.010  0.005 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Group -0.007 -0.006     
 (0.072) (0.070)     
Largest block-holder  
concentration   -0.003*** -0.003***   
   (0.001) (0.001)   
Bank in Group     -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.044) (0.043) 
Family     -0.005 -0.004 
     (0.039) (0.039) 
Government      0.096** 0.085** 
     (0.039) (0.037) 
Politically connected  0.026 0.025 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.030 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.034 -0.019 -0.022 -0.009 -0.033 -0.015 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.047) (0.045) (0.039) (0.033) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.044 -0.012 -0.026 -0.003 -0.043 -0.006 
 (0.137) (0.124) (0.125) (0.112) (0.129) (0.114) 
Observations 549 560 549 560 549 560 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 
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  Table 8—Determinants of Mergers:  Results of independent probit regressions used to predict merger of firms. 
Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company was taken over or undertook a merger with another firm 
during 1998-2000, and zero otherwise. The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust 
standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, 
* indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.174* 0.143* 0.142* 0.118 0.182** 0.150* 
 (0.090) (0.081) (0.082) (0.073) (0.089) (0.084) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] 0.000023*** 0.000019** 0.000023** 0.000019** 0.000023*** 0.000019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.055*** -0.060*** -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.063*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Collateral 0.173*** 0.161** 0.181*** 0.173** 0.167** 0.153** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.027 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) 
Return on Equity 0.0001658  0.0001315  0.0001855**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.007  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Group 0.021 0.024     
 (0.022) (0.020)     
Largest block-holder 
concentration   -0.002*** -0.002***   
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Bank in Group     0.026 0.029** 
     (0.017) (0.015) 
Family     -0.006 -0.008 
     (0.034) (0.033) 
Government      0.055* 0.049* 
     (0.031) (0.028) 
Politically connected  0.008 0.003 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.011 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) 
Industry Median MB Ratio 0.044 0.050 0.057 0.062 0.054 0.061 
 (0.058) (0.064) (0.054) (0.060) (0.063) (0.068) 
Industry Median Leverage 0.192 0.207 0.195 0.202 0.185 0.199 
 (0.160) (0.148) (0.157) (0.146) (0.163) (0.153) 
Observations 549 560 549 560 549 560 
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
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 Table 9—Determinants of Liquidations:  Results of independent probit regressions used to predict liquidations of 
firms. Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company was liquidated during 1998-2000, and zero 
otherwise. The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for 
country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-
, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.064** 0.059 0.023** 0.025 0.060* 0.056 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.012) (0.018) (0.033) (0.039) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] -0.0000621 -0.0000421 -.0000282 -0.000022 -0.0000464 -0.0000263 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.030 -0.033 -0.016* -0.017 -0.028 -0.032 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) 
Collateral -0.057 -0.053 -0.021 -0.020 -0.055 -0.052 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.015) (0.018) (0.042) (0.044) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD -0.004** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return on Equity -0.0000126  -0.0000139  -0.0000129  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Group -0.007 -0.007     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Largest block-holder 
concentration   -0.001* -0.001*   
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Bank in Group     0.001 0.002 
     (0.005) (0.004) 
Family     0.005 0.007 
     (0.005) (0.006) 
Government      0.016* 0.016 
     (0.008) (0.010) 
Politically connected  -0.009*** -0.009** -0.003* -0.003 -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.020) (0.010) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.049 -0.039 -0.021 -0.021 -0.050 -0.041 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.015) (0.019) (0.041) (0.042) 
Observations 549 560 549 560 549 560 
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.19 
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 Table 10—Multivariate probit regressions: The sample includes 559 companies with available data. The dependent 
variable is a vector of responses, where each element of the vector is an indicator variable of responses that takes the 
value 1 if the firms selects that response in distress. The four responses are as follows: (1) Workout is an agreement 
by the firms’ creditors to modify any terms of an outstanding financial claim currently held against the firm (for both 
public and private loan agreements); (2) Asset Sale includes news items that record both sales of assets and 
divestitures in subsidiaries or divisions in order to retire debt; (3) Merger is an indicator that denotes whether a 
given company merged or was taken over during 1998-2000; (4) Liquidation is an indicator that denotes whether a 
given company was liquidated during 1998-2000. The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. 
Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Coefficient Estimates of Multivariate Probit equations 
 Workout Asset Sale Mergers Liquidation 
Leverage 1.859*** 1.763*** 0.850* 2.304*** 
 (0.519) (0.333) (0.488) (0.830) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] -0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.592*** -0.972*** -0.347*** -1.439** 
 (0.215) (0.158) (0.070) (0.716) 
Collateral -0.145 -0.442 0.967** -1.993*** 
 (0.358) (0.331) (0.429) (0.693) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.324 0.814*** 0.148 -0.102 
 (0.210) (0.080) (0.166) (0.096) 
Sales/TA -0.504*** 0.053 -0.055 -0.087 
 (0.183) (0.083) (0.049) (0.262) 
Bank in Group 0.196 -0.033 0.142 -0.239** 
 (0.176) (0.409) (0.128) (0.114) 
Politically connected  0.144 0.134 0.023 -0.491*** 
 (0.214) (0.203) (0.144) (0.105) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.447 -0.115 0.301 0.260 
 (0.316) (0.187) (0.370) (0.323) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.153 -0.139 1.215 -1.484* 
 (0.534) (0.756) (0.916) (0.890) 
Constant  -2.299* -4.860*** -3.819*** 0.071 
 (1.276) (0.925) (0.947) (1.282) 
Number of Observations 560 
Log pseudo-likelihood -684.516 
 
 
Panel B. Estimates of the covariance terms of multivariate probit equation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
(2) 0.174** 
(0.082)   
(3) 0.132 
(0.103) 
0.168 
(0.107)  
(4) -0.108 (0.128) 
-0.228*** 
(0.084) 
0.020 
(0.103) 
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0: 
Chi2(6)= 8.38722   Prob > chi2 = 0.2111 
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 Table 11—Independent Probit regressions: The sample includes 559 companies with available data. In regression 
(1), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company opted for a workout of liabilities, and zero 
otherwise. In regression (2), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company undertook an asset sale, 
and zero otherwise. In regression (3), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company merged with 
another, and zero otherwise. In regression (4), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company was 
liquidated, and zero otherwise. The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard 
errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) 
Workout 
(2) 
Asset Sale 
(3) 
Mergers 
(4) 
Liquidation 
Leverage 1.865*** 1.789*** 0.856* 2.247*** 
 (0.528) (0.355) (0.475) (0.717) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] -0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.597*** -0.998*** -0.359*** -1.282** 
 (0.215) (0.165) (0.073) (0.623) 
Collateral -0.145 -0.475 0.961** -2.021*** 
 (0.352) (0.313) (0.427) (0.694) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.327 0.813*** 0.154 -0.127 
 (0.214) (0.082) (0.163) (0.082) 
Sales/TA -0.485** 0.055 -0.043 -0.097 
 (0.198) (0.077) (0.042) (0.267) 
Bank in Group 0.191 -0.035 0.149 -0.262*** 
 (0.177) (0.409) (0.123) (0.097) 
Politically connected  0.142 0.140 0.019 -0.496*** 
 (0.212) (0.202) (0.145) (0.106) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.455 -0.111 0.301 0.278 
 (0.324) (0.191) (0.373) (0.299) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.119 -0.073 1.235 -1.508* 
 (0.551) (0.730) (0.908) (0.863) 
Constant  -2.333* -4.881*** -3.863*** 0.094 
 (1.308) (0.892) (0.936) (1.248) 
Number of Observations 559 559 559 559 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.19 
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 Table 12—Comparison of “pre-crisis” and “post-crisis” price-to-sales multiples: The table reports average price-to-
sales multiples across 30 industries (defined by their 2-digit SIC codes) for recorded transactions in SDC for “pre-
crisis” period (1995-1997) and for the “post-crisis” period (1998-2000). The price-to-sales multiple is the ratio of 
the price paid for a transaction divided by the book value of sales for the given target. It is then averaged across all 
transactions in a given industry for each of the two sub-periods considered. The post-crisis multiple to pre-crisis 
multiple ratio for each industry is the ratio of the price-to-sales multiple for 1995-1997 to the price-to-sales multiple 
for 1998-2000. 
 
Industry 
2-digit 
SIC code 
Industry average 
pre-crisis 
price-to-sales multiple 
Industry average 
post- crisis 
price-to-sales multiple 
post-crisis multiple 
to 
pre-crisis multiple 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (1) /(2) 
8 2.261 6.556 2.899 
10 4.888 3.795 0.776 
14 4.424 5.404 1.222 
15 3.818 0.196 0.051 
20 3.691 1.057 0.286 
22 4.061 0.616 0.152 
24 10.889 0.721 0.066 
26 0.835 1.042 1.248 
27 3.903 1.512 0.387 
28 3.244 3.118 0.961 
30 8.958 4.487 0.501 
32 6.846 2.552 0.373 
33 2.160 0.729 0.338 
34 2.489 1.648 0.662 
35 0.938 0.244 0.260 
36 1.908 0.945 0.495 
37 1.042 0.476 0.457 
39 0.449 1.139 2.537 
44 4.905 1.119 0.228 
45 0.287 0.547 1.907 
48 4.409 4.129 0.937 
49 8.002 3.030 0.379 
50 0.431 0.795 1.844 
54 1.626 0.169 0.104 
55 1.098 0.037 0.034 
59 5.833 0.690 0.118 
70 8.032 3.253 0.405 
73 14.506 17.211 1.186 
79 4.905 2.970 0.605 
87 4.558 4.334 0.951 
    
All industries 4.180 2.484 0.594 
 
 110
 Table 13—Robustness checks on determinants of workouts for distressed firms only: A firm is defined to be 
financially distressed if during 1997-2000, the company had (any) two consecutive years with earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) less than its reported interest expense or, in any one year, 
EBITDA was less than 80% of the firm's interest expense. Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
company undertook a debt workout during 1998-2000, and zero otherwise. Workout is defined as an agreement by 
the firms’ creditors to modify any terms of an outstanding financial claim currently held against the firm (for both 
public and private loan agreements). The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust 
standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.718*** 0.479** 0.747*** 0.488** 0.719*** 0.481** 
 (0.137) (0.224) (0.156) (0.237) (0.110) (0.222) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.00028 -0.00015 -0.00036 -0.00016 -0.00038 -0.00017 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.238*** -0.166* -0.247*** -0.172* -0.245*** -0.173** 
 (0.052) (0.087) (0.062) (0.090) (0.041) (0.081) 
Collateral 0.104 0.068 0.086 0.050 0.094 0.054 
 (0.158) (0.148) (0.157) (0.152) (0.158) (0.145) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.209*** 0.201** 0.218*** 0.209** 0.213*** 0.207** 
 (0.068) (0.086) (0.067) (0.087) (0.074) (0.092) 
Return on Equity 0.0001  0.00021  0.00016  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.061  -0.061  -0.058 
  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Group 0.046 0.054     
 (0.081) (0.085)     
Largest block-holder concentration   0.002 0.002   
   (0.003) (0.004)   
Bank in Group     -0.002 0.001 
     (0.061) (0.066) 
Family     -0.014 -0.013 
     (0.073) (0.074) 
Government      -0.036 -0.065 
     (0.087) (0.057) 
Politically connected  0.035 0.020 0.027 0.016 0.040 0.026 
 (0.134) (0.129) (0.112) (0.106) (0.120) (0.117) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.192 -0.132 -0.169 -0.108 -0.155 -0.096 
 (0.330) (0.305) (0.380) (0.331) (0.355) (0.316) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.261 -0.082 -0.268 -0.080 -0.254 -0.073 
 (0.323) (0.393) (0.307) (0.388) (0.305) (0.375) 
Observations 265 271 265 271 265 271 
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.1 
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 Table 14—Robustness check on determinants of asset sales for distressed firms only: A firm is defined to be 
financially distressed if during 1997-2000, the company had (any) two consecutive years with earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) less than its reported interest expense or, in any one year, 
EBITDA was less than 80% of the firm's interest expense. Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
company undertook an asset sale during 1998-2000, and zero otherwise. Asset Sale includes news items that record 
both sales of assets and divestitures in subsidiaries or divisions in order to retire debt. Data on asset sales comes 
from two sources: (1) information concerning sales of assets reported in the Troubled Company Reporter, and  this 
is integrated with (2) data from SDC PlatinumTM which records information on the divestitures of subsidiaries. The 
definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level 
clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.303** 0.200** 0.258* 0.177* 0.315** 0.220** 
 (0.140) (0.101) (0.148) (0.104) (0.135) (0.091) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.000025 -0.000039 -0.000025 -0.000027 -0.000002 -0.000008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.136** -0.136*** -0.119** -0.124** -0.138** -0.134** 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) 
Collateral -0.017 -0.006 -0.004 0.010 0.015 0.017 
 (0.063) (0.076) (0.071) (0.088) (0.071) (0.076) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.149*** 0.154*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) 
Return on Equity 0.00039  0.00029  0.00029  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  0.018*  0.016  0.011 
  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Group -0.064 -0.063     
 (0.084) (0.077)     
Largest block-holder concentration   -0.002* -0.002***   
   (0.001) (0.001)   
Bank in Group     0.018 0.015 
     (0.033) (0.030) 
Family     -0.069*** -0.069*** 
     (0.025) (0.027) 
Government      0.064*** 0.036 
     (0.022) (0.027) 
Politically connected  0.025 0.025 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.035 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.056) (0.054) 
Industry Median MB Ratio 0.190*** 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.204*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 
 (0.070) (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) (0.047) 
Industry Median Leverage 0.195** 0.211** 0.195** 0.207** 0.163** 0.197*** 
 (0.096) (0.090) (0.088) (0.084) (0.077) (0.068) 
Observations 265 271 265 271 265 271 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
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 Table 15—Robustness check on determinants of mergers for distressed firms only: A firm is defined to be 
financially distressed if during 1997-2000, the company had (any) two consecutive years with earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) less than its reported interest expense or, in any one year, 
EBITDA was less than 80% of the firm's interest expense. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
company opted for a merger or was taken over, and zero otherwise. The definitions of the regressors are the same as 
in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below 
the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.108 0.066 0.096 0.056 0.149 0.105 
 (0.154) (0.138) (0.145) (0.130) (0.149) (0.151) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.000004 -0.000018 -0.0000003 -0.000012 -0.000018 -0.00009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.034 -0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.051 -0.054 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036) 
Collateral 0.294*** 0.275*** 0.305*** 0.293*** 0.271*** 0.249*** 
 (0.083) (0.090) (0.085) (0.092) (0.085) (0.095) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.052 0.057 0.050 0.055 0.053 0.058 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.066) (0.064) 
Return on Equity 0.00025**  0.00024*  0.00029**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.008  -0.005  -0.003 
  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
Group 0.012 0.020     
 (0.026) (0.025)     
Largest block-holder concentration   -0.002*** -0.002***   
   (0.001) (0.000)   
Bank in Group     0.089** 0.092*** 
     (0.036) (0.033) 
Family     -0.040 -0.045 
     (0.034) (0.033) 
Government      -0.006 -0.021 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
Politically connected  -0.024 -0.028 -0.012 -0.012 -0.034 -0.037 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.063) (0.064) (0.060) (0.061) 
Industry Median MB Ratio 0.190 0.197 0.197 0.205 0.220 0.231 
 (0.212) (0.235) (0.204) (0.224) (0.187) (0.202) 
Industry Median Leverage 0.447** 0.466*** 0.434** 0.444** 0.389** 0.402** 
 (0.179) (0.168) (0.184) (0.176) (0.172) (0.166) 
Observations 265 271 265 271 265 271 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 
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 Table 16—Robustness check on determinants of liquidations for distressed firms only: A firm is defined to be 
financially distressed if during 1997-2000, the company had (any) two consecutive years with earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) less than its reported interest expense or, in any one year, 
EBITDA was less than 80% of the firm's interest expense. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
company was liquidated, and zero otherwise. The definitions of the regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. 
Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal 
effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.102 0.097 0.039 0.052 0.099 0.091 
 (0.088) (0.094) (0.037) (0.055) (0.074) (0.085) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0. 00023 -0.00019 -0.0001 -0.00009 -0.00011 -0.00007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.047 -0.047 -0.027 -0.033 -0.042 -0.046 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.032) (0.038) (0.044) (0.053) 
Collateral -0.147 -0.151 -0.075 -0.084 -0.147 -0.153 
 (0.118) (0.125) (0.064) (0.080) (0.125) (0.134) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Return on Equity -0. 00005  -0.000046  -0.00004  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.011  -0.004  -0.012 
  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Group -0.032 -0.037     
 (0.033) (0.036)     
Largest block-holder concentration   -0.002 -0.002   
   (0.001) (0.001)   
Bank in Group     0.004 0.006 
     (0.021) (0.021) 
Family     0.024 0.031 
     (0.035) (0.039) 
Government      0.089*** 0.090* 
     (0.030) (0.051) 
Politically connected  -0.023*** -0.025** -0.009* -0.011 -0.028* -0.031 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.007 0.025 -0.025 -0.011 -0.047 -0.009 
 (0.047) (0.029) (0.048) (0.031) (0.072) (0.049) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.121 -0.104 -0.058 -0.068 -0.145 -0.125 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.065) (0.086) (0.137) (0.148) 
Observations 265 271 265 271 265 271 
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.17 
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 Table 17—Determinants of Asset Sales as measured by reduction in Property Plant and Equipment. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if there is drop in the book value of property, plant and equipment 
(gross of accumulated depreciation and amortization) that exceeds 10% of the book value of total assets in any given 
year. This indicator is built based on the Worldscope data for the period 1997-2000. The definitions of the regressors 
are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-level clustering, are reported in 
parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leverage 0.244** 0.200* 0.210** 0.179* 0.246** 0.193* 
 (0.125) (0.114) (0.106) (0.107) (0.120) (0.111) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/ Int. Expense] -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio 0.005 0.019 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.019 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.028) (0.037) (0.030) (0.038) 
Collateral -0.075 -0.079 -0.062 -0.064 -0.067 -0.074 
 (0.098) (0.085) (0.095) (0.081) (0.097) (0.086) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD -0.066* -0.063 -0.064* -0.059 -0.060 -0.055 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.047) 
Return on Equity 0.000  -0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sales/TA  -0.026  -0.020  -0.028 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
Group 0.047*** 0.052***     
 (0.013) (0.017)     
Largest block-holder concentration   -0.004** -0.003**   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Bank in Group     -0.052 -0.056 
     (0.041) (0.037) 
Family     0.067 0.067 
     (0.068) (0.074) 
Government      0.127*** 0.112*** 
     (0.042) (0.032) 
Politically connected  0.024 0.032 0.049** 0.057** 0.027 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.040) 
Industry Median MB Ratio 0.004 -0.011 0.032 0.014 -0.007 -0.023 
 (0.057) (0.052) (0.063) (0.057) (0.051) (0.041) 
Industry Median Leverage 0.190*** 0.228*** 0.186*** 0.214*** 0.190** 0.231*** 
 (0.069) (0.045) (0.067) (0.041) (0.080) (0.044) 
Observations 548 559 548 559 548 559 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
 115
 Table 18—Robustness check using Return on Assets (ROA) as the measure of operating performance: The sample 
includes 555 companies with available data. In regression (1), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
company opted for a workout of liabilities, and zero otherwise. In regression (2), the dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if a company undertook an asset sale, and zero otherwise. In regression (3), the dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company merged with another, and zero otherwise. In regression (4), the 
dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company was liquidated, and zero otherwise. Return on Assets 
(ROA) is calculated as annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by year-end total assets (%). The 
definitions of the other regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-
level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 
10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) 
Workout 
(2) 
Asset Sale 
(3) 
Mergers 
(4) 
Liquidation 
Leverage 0.435*** 0.297*** 0.159** 0.064** 
 (0.097) (0.067) (0.080) (0.032) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] -0. 00002 -0.000008 0.000025** -0.000003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.194*** -0.166*** -0.059*** -0.025* 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.010) (0.015) 
Collateral 0.007 -0.087 0.170*** -0.040 
 (0.092) (0.053) (0.064) (0.030) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.099*** 0.138*** 0.024 -0.005*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.001) 
Return on Assets -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Group 0.044 -0.004 0.023 -0.007 
 (0.029) (0.069) (0.022) (0.004) 
Politically connected  0.054 0.024 0.009 -0.005*** 
 (0.048) (0.043) (0.024) (0.001) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.090 -0.016 0.049 0.002 
 (0.116) (0.032) (0.064) (0.007) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.074 -0.003 0.201 -0.042 
 (0.106) (0.125) (0.147) (0.034) 
Number of Observations 555 555 555 555 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.22 
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 Table 19—Robustness check using Industry Adjusted EBITDA/TA as the measure of operating performance: The 
sample includes 559 companies with available data. In regression (1), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 
1 if a company opted for a workout of liabilities, and zero otherwise. In regression (2), the dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if a company undertook an asset sale, and zero otherwise. In regression (3), the dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company merged with another, and zero otherwise. In regression (4), the 
dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a company was liquidated, and zero otherwise. Industry Adjusted 
EBITDA/Assets ratio is defined as the ratio of the earnings of a company before interest expense, income taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), to the book value of total assets. The ratio is netted out of its industry 
median (evaluated across countries), where a firm’s industry is given by its primary two-digit SIC code. The 
definitions of the other regressors are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors, corrected for country-
level clustering, are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5- and 
10-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) 
Workout 
(2) 
Asset Sale 
(3) 
Mergers 
(4) 
Liquidation 
Leverage 0.537*** 0.341*** 0.145 0.064* 
 (0.101) (0.040) (0.110) (0.036) 
[(Int. Expense – EBITDA) 
/Int. Expense] 0. 000012 0.000007 0. 00002** -0.000001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt. Value/ Book Ratio -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.061*** -0.020 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.010) (0.015) 
Collateral -0.0001 -0.091* 0.165** -0.046 
 (0.087) (0.051) (0.068) (0.034) 
Log (Mkt. capital) in USD 0.084** 0.132*** 0.026 -0.003 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.026) (0.002) 
Industry Adjusted EBITDA/TA 0.209* 0.135* 0.002 0.051*** 
 (0.125) (0.074) (0.096) (0.013) 
Group 0.043 -0.006 0.024 -0.006 
 (0.038) (0.072) (0.020) (0.004) 
Politically connected  0.065 0.029 0.005 -0.006*** 
 (0.071) (0.044) (0.025) (0.002) 
Industry Median MB Ratio -0.142 -0.014 0.050 -0.000 
 (0.091) (0.031) (0.064) (0.009) 
Industry Median Leverage -0.124 -0.032 0.202 -0.045 
 (0.105) (0.126) (0.161) (0.038) 
Number of Observations 559 559 559 559 
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.22 
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Appendix: Examples of news articles from the Internet Bankruptcy
Librarys web site
Examples of liquidations
ANAM ELECTRONICS: Applied for liquidation
(TCR: Monday, March 22, 1999, Vol. 2, No. 56)
According to the Korean language Maeil Kyungjes Business Brief section, the Anam
Electronics Company applied for liquidation. Earlier newspaper reports mentioned that the
Anam Electronics companys workout program was terminated on March 17th, 1999 when
the main creditor of the electronics maker, Seoul Guarantee Insurance Company, refused to
continue the companys workout program on the grounds of weak company performance.
CHONGGU CORP: To Seek Court Receivership
(TCR: Thursday, May 7, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 54)
A leading South Korean construction company, Chonggu Corp., which led for court
protection to reschedule its debts repayment, said Wednesday that it would instead seek
court receivership within the week, sources at Chonggu and the Taegu District Court said.
Under Korean bankruptcy law, a company loses managerial rights under court receivership
and is liquidated. But under court protection, it can restructure, while retaining managerial
control. The home-building rm would le for liquidation and court receivership Friday, on
the recommendation of the court, the sources added. Chonggus new direction comes on the
heels of two big retailers, New Core and Midopa, being turned down for court protection
for debt rescheduling by the courts. Judge Park Tae-ho of the Taegu court said that he had
advised Chonggu Group chairman to le for liquidation because most of the conglomerates
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a¢ liates had shown little sign of viability and had complicated debt problems. Three
Chonggu a¢ liates, including the Bluehill Department Store, are likely to follow in the steps
of its parent company. (Asia Pulse 06-May-1998)
PT DHARMALA SAKTI SEJAHTERA: Court keeps bankruptcy status
(TCR: Monday, August 7, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 152)
The Supreme Court has rejected PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahteras appeal to revoke the
companys bankruptcy status, according to court documents. The Supreme Court said there
were no legal defects to the original bankruptcy ruling issued by the Jakarta Commercial
Court. "The appeal cannot be sustained. We do not see that the Jakarta Commercial Court
misapplying the bankruptcy law in its ruling against the company," the Supreme Court said.
Dharmala Sakti was declared bankrupt in early June after the majority of its creditors voted
to reject the companys debt restructuring proposal. In its appeal the company claimed
that the Jakarta Commercial Court had permitted a creditor vote "prematurely," and that
two creditors acted in bad faith by inuenced other creditors to vote against the debt
restructuring proposal. Dharmala Sakti is now under court-supervised liquidation. (AFX
News Limited 03- Aug-2000)
Examples of asset sales
AMSTEEL CORP BHD, LION GROUP: Finalizing restructuring scheme
(TCR: Tuesday, June 27, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 124)
The groups main problem appears to be Amsteel Corp Bhd, which has lots of other
businesses, some unprotable. Amsteel has incurred loans of nearly RM8.5bil which made
up the bulk of the RM10.5bil in debts that the Lion group has. Major asset sales, expected
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to be spread over ve years, would involve the potential divestment of: Shopping complexes
such as the Subang Parade and Klang Parade in Selangor and the Mahkota Parade in
Malacca; Asia Commercial Finance Bhd; A large stake in Malaysia British Assurance Bhd.
and Klang-based Amsteel Securities Sdn Bhd. One major transaction already completed
has been the sale of a 50% stake in Invern Sdn Bhd, owner of Menara Lion, in a deal
valued at RM200mil. Invern is 70% owned by Amsteel and the deal resulted in a net cash
inow of RM55.53mil. The group was supposed to have made an announcement on their
restructuring in April but had to defer it because some issues had to be thrashed out with
more than 100 creditors. (The Star Online 24-Jun-2000)
SAN MIGUEL: Sells stake in drinks business
(TCR: Thursday, July 16, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 102)
RP-Business News cites an Agence France-Presse article that Philippine food-and-
beverage giant San Miguel Corp. has sold its 47-percent stake in a British soft drink
bottling business spun o¤ by Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd. (CCA) of Australia. The sale in
London fetched 339.6 million pounds (555 million dollars), it said. San Miguel is the sec-
ond largest shareholder of CCA with 25 percent, the result of a 2.7-billion-dollar stock
swap agreement last year to create the largest Coca-Cola bottling group outside the United
States. The company invested more than 400 million dollars on a string of breweries and
packaging plants in Hong Kong, China, Vietnam and Indonesia which went sour amid the
Asian nancial crisis.
DAEWOO TELECOM: Sells o¤ IT division
(TCR: Thursday, October 12, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 199)
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Daewoo Telecom announced Tuesday it signed a formal contract to sell o¤ its IT opera-
tions to Mercury Telecom, a multinational holding rm. Daewoos IT operations will launch
as Mercury Telecom beginning from November 1 as the special shareholdersmeeting of the
Korean rm, planned on October 25, is expected to endorse the deal. Daewoo Telecom
precedes all 12 Daewoo business group subsidiaries undergoing workouts in the sell-o¤ bid.
The selling price of the IT operations ranges from W330 billion to W370 billion, depending
on performance this year and next, according to Daewoo Telecom. Mercury Telecom has
been set up as a consortium, led by CVC, an investment arm of Citigroup of the United
States. (Digital Chosun 10-Oct-2000)
Examples of workouts
PT MEDCO ENERGI CORP.: Gets creditor approval of rehab
(TCR: Monday, November 6, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 216)
PT Medco Energi Corp. (JSX:MEDC) said part of its debts would be converted into
shares and the rest would be settled with a rollover of 8 years. A company spokesman
said the decision was made in a meeting last week attended by its creditors representing
92% of its total loan. The spokesman said the creditors gave commitment to support the
restructuring program of the oil and gas contractor. In an earlier meeting, Medco succeeded
in securing agreement from the majority of 52% of the creditors to restructure its US$ 250
million debts. (Asia Pulse 22-Oct-1999)
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORP.: P6.5B loan deal with Blue Circle
(TCR: Monday, August 28, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 167)
Republic Cement Corp. (RCC) will borrow P6.5 billion from Blue Circle Philippines
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Inc. (BCPI) for its capital expenditure requirements and debt servicing. As of end-1999,
RCC total borrowings were pegged at P2.433 billion. It ended the year with a net loss
of P383.70 million. BCPI owns P495.8-million shares in RCC. The shares represent a
34-percent stake. It is a unit of London-based Blue Circle Industries Plc. "The board of
directors unanimously approved the availment by the corporation of a loan from BCPI up to
the maximum principal amount of P6.5 billion and under such terms and conditions as may
be agreed upon with BCPI. Part of the loan proceeds shall be used by the corporation to
prepay its outstanding loans with various creditors," RCC senior vice president for nance
Renato C. Sunico said in a disclosure to the Philippine Stock Exchange. (The Manila Times
26-Aug-2000)
ACESITE HOTEL CORP.: Foreign rm in debt bailout
(TCR: Friday, November 24, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 229)
A British Virgin Island company will bail out the owners of local hotel operator Acesite
(Phils.) Hotel Corp. (APHC) from debts owed to a local bank through the acquisition
of 75% stake in the listed rms majority shareholder. APHC president Francis Lam said
the South Port Development Ltd. will acquire Acesite (BVI) Ltd. which owns majority
interest in APHC, operator of the Holiday Inn Manila for 1.66 billion Philippine pesos
($33.50 million at PhP49.554=$1). The sale will avoid the foreclosure of shares in Acesite
Limited and APHC by Equitable PCI Bank. The said shares were used as collateral by
Acesite Limited owners Evallon Investment Ltd. and Sino-i.com Ltd. to secure a $2-million
loan from the local bank. South Port is currently engaged in the leisure business in the
Peoples Republic of China and Australia. Mr. Lam said the foreign rm is expected to
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bring new marketing and business opportunities to APHC. "This constitutes a positive
contributing factor to the enhancement of the corporations future operations and nancial
position," he said. (Business World 22-Nov-2000)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A widely accepted feature of nancial markets across the world is that there are
limits to access credit. While this problem is extremely acute at times of economic
crisis and recession, it is also prevalent at times of robust economic growth. When
investment opportunities in an economy are strong, outside banks seek to enter the
markets in search of higher prots. Presumably, removal of regulatory barriers that
facilitates the entry of foreign banks should increase access to credit for local rms.
However, opinion is divided as to whether this actually occurs in practice.
On the other hand, when rms are faced with economy-wide crisis, liquidity con-
straints are fairly acute. In such circumstances, perfect capital markets would require
that scarce capital be allocated to its highest marginal return making wealth distri-
bution irrelevant. Here too, previous work suggests that the functional e¢ ciency of
capital markets depends on the distribution of corporate control in an economy.
The rst two essays are aimed to gain a better understanding of the rst problem,
primarily from a theoretical standpoint, while the third essay is an empirical study
of issues that govern the second problem. The rst two essays show that asymmetric
information between incumbents and entrant banks can work as an endogenous barrier
to entry. Moreover, entrant banks nd it easier to secure markets with better borrower
quality but have to engage in costly screening where rm quality is poor, as is the case
for the small-rm market. The third essay nds that, contrary to popular belief, the
distribution of corporate control mattered little in the resolution of nancial distress
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for rms that were a¤ected by the crisis in East Asia. Our empirical results conclude
that nancial considerations were predominant in the resolving rm-specic distress.
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